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ABSTRACT
Despite increasing criticism, Delaware’s dominance in corporate law
has not experienced a significant decline: as of today, 67.8 percent of
Fortune 500 companies are still incorporated in its jurisdiction.
Nevada is known as Delaware’s most important competitor, with an
aggressive strategy that has overridden the efforts of any other
jurisdiction. Yet, its success has been limited to a specific market
segment: small firms with low institutional shareholding and high
insider ownership.
Scholars suggest several explanations for both the rise and the staying
power of Delaware. These explanations are essentially subsumed
under the credible commitment theory and the network theory.
According to the former, investors rely upon Delaware’s commitment
towards the business community; while the latter emphasizes how
Delaware is profiting from the position it has achieved. The credible
commitment theory and the network theory sometimes overlap and
combine. Both predict that Delaware is hard to dethrone.
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In recent years, commentators have argued that this hegemony might
be endangered by two different threats: the migration of cases induced
by Delaware courts’ response to overlitigation; and the invasive
growth of federal regulation — in particular, the possible introduction
of a federal incorporation. Yet, criticisms and predictions on
Delaware’s decline are recurring and always follow the same pattern.
In this instance, unsurprisingly, the migration turned out to be
marginal, and although the debate on a federal incorporation was
revived in conjunction with a political campaign, it fizzled out soon
after the Democratic primaries ended.
I contend that a mounting challenge to Delaware’s dominance is
mostly flying under the radar. Wyoming is targeting a new segment
of the market for corporate charters: digital asset businesses. This
jurisdiction is attempting to attract these incorporators by enacting
liberal legislation and providing their companies with a safe harbor.
Wyoming’s aggressive stance provides the motivation to canvass
causes and consequences, criticism, and challenges to Delaware’s
dominance. The investigation can generate insights as to why
Wyoming’s strategy will succeed or fail. In fact, this market
segmentation approach is the same tactic that Nevada adopted, though
Wyoming is applying the strategy to a sector that has meaningful
growth potential and is pushing it to the point of introducing
exemptions to state securities laws and banking regulation.
The application of the credible commitment theory and the network
theory to Wyoming’s approach suggests that this strategy of building
a reputation and proving a commitment to tech-incorporators is on the
right track, but success also requires a confluence of events that need
time. To ensure supremacy in digital assets, Wyoming should develop
an expertise that is too costly to be easily replicated by other
jurisdictions and earn a share of the charters market before federal
legislature and regulatory bodies pre-empt Wyoming’s law for
cryptocurrencies.
To the extent that Wyoming’s strategy proves to be effective, it will
gain this jurisdiction the lead only in the blockchain segment of the
market, while Delaware will continue to dominate the rest of corporate
law.
In light of all this, Wyoming’s approach might be a dare. Yet, it is also
the most promising—maybe the only possible—challenge to
Delaware’s dominance at the present time.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1209 North Orange Street in Wilmington,1 Delaware, is an address
that few would recognize as a site of American power.2 Yet, it could
probably rival 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and any other address in
Washington D.C. There, in a bland, single-story brick building one is
unlikely to give a second glance while driving past, is the registered office
of 67.8 percent of Fortune 500 companies.3 This means that Delaware,
having less than one-third of one percent4 of the U.S. population, is by far
the primary place of incorporation for the most important businesses in
the world.
This numerical dominance would not matter—and would not exist—
if it were not for the well-known internal affairs doctrine, according to
which “the law of the state of incorporation normally determines issues
relating to the internal affairs of the corporation.”5 Since the rules
governing the internal affairs of a corporation originate from the state in
which the corporation is chartered, all disputes over corporate governance
involving companies incorporated in Delaware are adjudicated using
Delaware law. As a consequence, Delaware courts adjudicate so many
cases on corporations that they have developed a robust body of legal
precedents, far outstripping any other jurisdiction. Even in cases where
1.
2.

Precisely, in the Brandywine neighborhood of Wilmington.
See Kent Greenfield, End Delaware’s Corporate Dominance, DEMOCRACY,
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/39/end-delawares-corporate-dominance/
[https://perma.cc/GYF7-7N7A] (last visited Jan. 24, 2022). See generally Kent
Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 67 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2004).
3. The renowned annual list compiled by Fortune that ranks the largest U.S.
corporations by total revenue in that fiscal year. More than one million business entities
claim Delaware as their home state. 80 percent of recent IPO firms are incorporated in
Delaware. See A Message from the Secretary of State – Jeffrey W. Bullock, DEL. DIV.
CORPS. 2019 ANN. REP. STATS., https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/Annual-Reports/Divisionof-Corporations-2019-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KDH-EJUE] (last visited
Oct. 17, 2021).
4. Approximately 950,000.
5. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 621 (1983). To put it in other words, “[t]he internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of
laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate
a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or between
the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.” Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
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Delaware corporate law does not apply, other jurisdictions often look to
the precedents of Delaware courts. Businesses incorporate in this
jurisdiction because they seek Delaware law and its court system; this is
what maintains Delaware’s prevalence over competitors in the corporate
charters market. This hegemony and the resulting pre-eminence in
corporate law constitute Delaware’s dominance.
Such a by-product of American federalism6 has persisted for over a
century7, although it has been regularly criticized by scholars and
challenged by aspiring competitors.8 Recently, commentators have
focused on the migration of cases out of Delaware and on a possible
federal incorporation law.9 Others argue that entrepreneurial offshore
jurisdictions have recently been using permissive rules in corporate
governance and specialized business courts to attract American public
corporations.10 Yet, I contend that the current, most significant threat for
Delaware’s dominance has mostly gone under the radar: the mounting
challenge posed by Wyoming through technological innovation, namely,
through Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) such as blockchain.
Wyoming’s aggressive stance provides the motivation to canvass
Delaware’s dominance. In particular, an analysis of the causes and
consequences, criticisms, and challenges can generate insights as to why
Wyoming’s strategy will succeed or fail.
In Part II, I illustrate the origins of Delaware’s lead and the reasons
for its endurance. Scholars have traditionally subsumed said reasons
under two main theories: the credible commitment theory and the network
theory. Under the credible commitment theory, managers and investors
rely upon Delaware’s commitment towards the business community:
Delaware lawmakers respond promptly to the needs of corporate
constituencies, and the efficiency and predictability of its judicial system
permit businesses to thrive and flourish. This reliance is held to be the real
asset from which this jurisdiction is benefitting. The network theory
emphasizes how Delaware is profiting extensively from the reputation
and position it has achieved. For instance, lawyers tend to encourage
6. See Robert B. Thompson, Delaware’s Dominance: A Peculiar Illustration of
American Federalism, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED? EVALUATING DELAWARE’S
DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 57, 75-77 (Stephen M. Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018).
7. See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs
Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33, 42-43 (2006); Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s
General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 271-72 (1976).
8. See infra Part III.
9. See discussion infra Section III.B.
10. See infra Section III.C.3.
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clients to incorporate in Delaware because they are taught Delaware
corporate law in law schools and because its courts grant higher attorneys’
fees. These two theories often intertwine and combine. Both conclude that
Delaware is hard to dethrone.
In Part III, I focus on criticism and challenges. Nevada is known as
the traditional Delaware competitor, with an aggressive strategy that has
overridden the efforts of any other jurisdiction. Yet, its success has been
limited to a specific market segment (small firms), and Delaware’s
dominance ultimately persisted.
A second threat was posed by the migration of litigation out of
Delaware. This migration occurred in response to some doctrinal shifts
adopted by Delaware’s courts to curb overlitigation in Mergers and
Acquisitions (M&A). However, the migration was marginal and, in the
end, did not undermine Delaware’s dominance.
Finally, another potential obstacle comes from the federal erosion of
state corporate law. This is a general threat since it would impact the
whole corporate charter market. If federal legislation takes over corporate
law, the room for competition shrinks; but also, the differentiation
between state laws narrows, resulting in Delaware’s attractiveness
becoming less enticing, which would affect its authority. For instance,
federal erosion could derive from Congressional attempts to curtail some
inequalities allegedly caused by Delaware’s lead in corporate law. In this
regard, a recent federal bill, the “Accountable Capitalism Act,” stimulated
a vivid debate. The bill did not pass but, if enacted, would have introduced
several significant amendments and required large companies to obtain a
federal corporate charter in addition to the state incorporation. I argue that
a federal incorporation requirement is unlikely to see the light of day.
History proves that the federal lawmakers have never succeeded in
pushing it very far. Usually, the debate gains strength in conjunction with
a crisis or a presidential election and fades afterwards.
Some commentators contend that federal intervention might also be
provoked by offshore corporate law havens. These jurisdictions have been
attempting to attract American publicly traded corporations by offering a
lax corporate law and enabling these firms to elude American mandatory
rules in corporate governance. This would erode investor and shareholder
protections that are guaranteed by the core of state corporate law. Yet,
there are some conflicting indications and countervailing considerations
on the threat posed by this international jurisdictional competition. Claims
on this topic are premature anyway; further, any intervention to halt this
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state-to-nation state competition might not necessarily affect the statebased market.
In contrast—as I argue in Part IV—technological innovation has the
potential to kick off a new competition in the market for corporate
charters, one that centers around attracting blockchain businesses. Some
jurisdictions see this technology as a risk to manage through regulation.
Others see it as an opportunity to innovate corporate governance.
Wyoming has a different, sophisticated strategy: it has passed avant-garde
legislation to provide a safe harbor for digital asset companies, introduced
a blockchain-dedicated chancery court, and replicated the initiatives put
in place by Nevada to attract incorporators.
In essence, Wyoming aims to carve out a specific share of the
corporate charters market, remove it from the sphere of Delaware’s
control, and dominate it. This market segmentation approach is the same
tactic that Nevada adopted for its niche but, unlike Nevada, Wyoming is
applying it to a sector that has meaningful growth potential and is pushing
the differentiation to the point of implementing state securities and
banking regulations.
The application of the credible commitment theory and the network
theory indicates that Wyoming’s strategy needs a distinct combination of
factors to be successful. Above all, it needs time to build a credible
reputation and a network from which to benefit. Further, a competitive
advantage merely based on legislation might be transient; free-ride legal
innovations are easy for other jurisdictions to copy and are likely to lead
only to short-term gains in the market for corporate charters. Wyoming
should achieve an expertise that other jurisdictions could not easily
replicate, such as specialized courts and a body of case law on blockchain
and virtual currencies. However, this would also need time to develop.
Nevertheless, in the face of particularly liberal laws, such as those
passed by Wyoming for cryptocurrencies and tokens, federal legislature
might intervene by enacting some regulation and halt the state’s ambition.
That said, despite the doubts and the risky approach, I contend that
Wyoming’s ambition constitutes the most significant threat which is
currently looming over Delaware’s leading position. Specifically, I argue
that Wyoming’s tactic is the most promising—if not the only possible—
strategy that can challenge Delaware in the current context. However, it
is a limited threat in the sense that, if successful, would only make
Wyoming the leader of the market segment of cryptocurrency and tokenbased businesses incorporations.
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II. THE RISE OF DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE
A. THE ORIGINS
1. The Market for Corporate Charters
The story of Delaware’s dominance is mostly the story of American
capitalism and American corporate law. The market for corporate charters
did not start until the last quarter of the 19th century.11 Previously, there
was no such market for the simple reason that there was no need for it;
state legislatures granted corporate charters by passing individual,
customized pieces of legislation.12 Besides, there was virtually no
significant interstate trade, and local entrepreneurs had no reason to
incorporate outside the state where they were conducting business. 13
Needless to say, state legislatures were inclined to grant more desirable
and less restrictive charters to those incorporators who were able to
“influence” them in some way.14 This inclination generated inequalities
and raised some criticism.15
In 1811, the State of New York passed the first general incorporation
16
law. Shortly after, many states followed suit and passed enabling laws
that permitted incorporators to establish a corporation by simply meeting

11. In 1875, there was a shift from incorporations via special acts to incorporation
under general laws; yet, the trend became dominant starting in 1878. See GEORGE
HEBERTON EVANS JR., BUSINESS INCORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1800-1943
31-32 (1948). See also Robert E. Wright, US Corporate Development 1790-1860,
PENNLIBRARIES (Jan. 26, 2015), https://repository.upenn.edu/mead/7/ [https://perma.cc/
HFG9-CTRD]. On the intertwine among capitalism, corporate law, and American
history, see JONATHAN LEVY, AGES OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM: A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (1st ed. 2021).
12. See EVANS JR., supra note 11, at 31.
13. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY, 4 (2d ed. 1991).
14. Id. at 5-7.
15. Corporations, which are nowadays the basic vehicle for market and competition,
were at the beginning a source of inequality: they were actually conceived in order to
grant privileges, such as monopoly trading rights and tax exemptions – in addition to the
limited liability that remains still today. See LORRAINE TALBOT, CRITICAL COMPANY LAW
8 (1st ed. 2008).
16. See Eric Hilt, Corporation Law and the Shift Toward Open Access in the
Antebellum United States, in ORGANIZATIONS, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE ROOTS OF
DEVELOPMENT 147, 152 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & John Joseph Wallis eds., 2017).
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some requirements and filing an application.17 The legislatures set a
model corporate form but, unsurprisingly, did not repeal the system of
special charters and did not start a competition for incorporation. As a
matter of fact, the new legislations were not underpinned by the purpose
of curbing inequalities.18 Rather, they were merely intended to increase
the number of incorporations and benefit further from the tax revenues. 19
The result was a two-tier market for incorporation based on price: the
wealthiest capitalists could purchase special charters while the poorest
had to meet the requirements set out in the state general incorporation
laws and merely enjoy the standardized privileges provided therein.20
Then came the era of the constitutional prohibition of the special
charter system. Louisiana was the first state to adopt an absolute
prohibition in 1845.21 Other states adopted a similar approach by passing
partial prohibitions, and the granting of special charters became restricted
to those cases “where, in the judgment of the legislature, the objects of
the corporation cannot be attained under general laws.”22 This evidently
did not mean much, since the same state legislatures had to decide when
a case required a special act and, consequently, pass it.23 Thus, despite the
technical change, state legislatures substantially retained the power to
grant special charters and continued to issue them.24 The best law was
simply for sale, and only the richest could afford it.
This system ended due to the growth of the previously state-based
markets and a clarification on a question of law: whether a corporation
incorporated in one state could trade in another. Before the industrial
expansion of the second half of the 19th century, the question was not so
pressing and it was generally considered not permitted.25 In the post17.
18.
19.

Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 159-60.
Since passing customized charters was time-consuming and state legislatures
were unable to satisfy all the requests. See TALBOT, supra note 15, at 11.
20. See Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the
Granting of Corporate Privileges, J.L. STUD. 129, 143 (1977).
21. See TALBOT, supra note 15. For a discussion of the 1845 Louisiana Constitution,
see Judith K. Schafer, Reform or Experiment? The Louisiana Constitution of 1845, in IN
SEARCH OF FUNDAMENTAL LAW: LOUISIANA’S CONSTITUTIONS, 1812-1974 21, 21-36
(Warren M. Billings & Edward F. Haas eds., 1993).
22. N.Y. CONST. art. X, § 1.
23. See Butler, supra note 20, at 144.
24. Id. at 143.
25. See SARATH SANGA, THE ORIGINS OF THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE LAW 2 n.1
(2020), (quoting Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839): “It is very true that a
corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which
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Jeffersonian, industrializing America, the dramatic acceleration of
economic growth caused small, local firms to give way to large
companies.26 Thus, the question on whether a corporation could trade in
any state regardless of the state of incorporation demanded an answer.
The 1869 U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Paul v. Virginia27 is
traditionally considered to be said answer.28 Although the Court upheld
the restriction imposed by Virginia on insurance companies incorporated
in other jurisdictions, it did not explicitly state that a corporation
registered elsewhere could not trade in Virginia.29 The by-product of this
decision has been interpreted by many scholars as a judicial recognition
of interstate business for “foreign” companies and the beginning of states’
competition to attract incorporators (and the revenues associated therein)
by offering the most suitable corporate law.30
In contrast, some argue that Supreme Court jurisprudence, including
Paul, did not promote the competition for a national incorporation.31
According to this view, Paul is “one in a long line of cases that opposed
a national market and empowered states to discriminate against foreign
corporations.”32 Instead, they argue, the incorporation market emerged as
a result of industrial expansion and interstate commerce.33

it is created.”), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3503628 [https://
perma.cc/3JBV-8WJW]. Sanga adds, “No less than Alexander Hamilton, the champion
of corporate America, believed that a corporation chartered in one state had no inherent
power to operate in another.” Id. at 2.
26. See TALBOT, supra note 15, at 10.
27. 75 U.S. 168 (1869).
28. “The traditional narrative paints a chain of causality that begins in the Supreme
Court, moves to New Jersey, and ultimately settles in Delaware.” SANGA, supra note 25,
at 2. Sanga adds that these widely held beliefs are untrue. Id. at 1.
29. See TALBOT, supra note 21, at 10.
30. LINDA O. SMIDDY & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 228-31 (2014); TALBOT,
supra note 21, at 10.
31. See SANGA, supra note 25, at 9-12.
32. Id. at 12. See Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 652, 656-59 (1895); Phila. Fire
Ass’n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 118-20 (1886); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337
U.S. 562, 571 (1949); Doyle v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 542 (1876). In this view, the
Supreme Court opposed a national market for corporate charters throughout the 19th
century and into the 20th century, by regularly affirming the states’ ability to discriminate
against companies incorporated in other states.
33. “The market for corporate law emerged in spite of–not because of–the Supreme
Court.” See SANGA, supra note 25, at 4.
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Regardless of whether it was a product, a by-product, an unintended
consequence of Supreme Court jurisprudence, or the outcome of driving
economic forces, by the late 19th century the market for incorporations
was established and bustling.34
2. From New Jersey’s Short-Lived Success to the Rise of Delaware’s
Dominance
As the market for corporate charters developed, New Jersey was the
first to profit from the opportunity and establish a leading position.35 This
jurisdiction was already known for its innovative approach to corporate
law. In 1875, it had passed the first of many acts considered to be the
blueprint for modern general incorporation laws.36 This act, combined
with the 1889 amendments,37 made New Jersey a desirable state of
incorporation.38 The physical proximity to New York might also have
been a relevant factor.
In 1891, the state legislature enacted the New Jersey Holding
Company Act, which permitted corporations to control or own stock in
other entities.39 In 1896, new amendments removed time limitations on
corporate existence and general limitations on the corporation’s
capitalization.40 These amendments also made mergers easier and
permitted a wide scope of business activity.41
Modern corporate law was taking shape, and, above all, New
Jersey’s strategy of liberal corporate statutes was succeeding.
Incorporations in New Jersey skyrocketed and so did the revenues from
incorporation fees and franchise taxes.42 As a result, by the turn of the

34.
35.
36.

Id. at 19. See generally EVANS JR., supra note 11.
SANGA, supra note 25, at 2-3.
See Fred Freedland, History of Holding Company Legislation in New York State:
Some Doubts as to the “New Jersey First” Tradition, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 369, 377
(1955).
37. “The 1889 statute authorized all corporations formed under the 1875 general
corporation act, as amended, to purchase ‘the stock of any company or companies
owning, mining, manufacturing or producing materials, or other property, necessary for
their business . . . .’” Id. at 400.
38. Id.
39. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:27A-1 et seq. (West 1891).
40. See SANGA, supra note 25.
41. Id.
42. See Hilt, supra note 16, at 153-54.
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new century,43 New Jersey had paid off its state debt and abolished
property taxes.44
Predictably, other states followed New Jersey’s example and
adopted similar corporate statutes.45 Delaware in particular mirrored New
Jersey’s legislation on corporations, to such an extent that, in a 1900 case,
a Delaware court upheld that New Jersey’s legal precedents on
corporations had authority in Delaware as well.46 Fundamentally, this
allowed Delaware’s courts to exploit New Jersey’s more mature body of
case law and attract incorporators. Thus, starting from 1904,
incorporations in Delaware began to grow more rapidly than in other
states.47
In 1910, with the election of Woodrow Wilson as governor,48 the
success of New Jersey as incorporators’ favorite destination came to an
end. Wilson had based his political campaign on a fierce opposition to
large corporations and their alleged abuses.49 Once elected, he made the
state legislature pass a series of bills, known as the Seven Sisters, which
enhanced regulators’ powers and restricted corporate ones.50 Some
suggest that this shift to a more regulatory approach was the main reason
why incorporators migrated from Trenton to Wilmington to incorporate
(or even re-incorporate) their businesses in Delaware.51 Others see it as a
43.
44.

Precisely in 1902.
See Cristopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929,
49 J. ECON. HIST. 667, 681-82 (1989).
45. See P. M. Vasudev, Corporate Law and Its Efficiency: A Review of History, 50
AM. J. LEG. HIST. 237, 274 (2010); TALBOT, supra note 15, at 15.
46. Since “legislature, in adopting the language of the New Jersey statute, had in
mind the construction given to it by the New Jersey courts . . . .” Wilmington City Ry.
Co. v. People’s Ry. Co., 47 A. 245, 254 (Del. Ch. 1900).
47. Specifically, from 1904 to 1917 the trends diverge: the number of incorporations
in Delaware and New York climbed significantly, while in other states, such as Maine,
they plummeted. See EVANS JR., supra note 11, at 31.
48. Woodrow Wilson later became the 28th President of the United States.
49. See Saladin Ambar, Woodrow Wilson: Campaigns and Elections, UVA MILLER
CENTER, https://millercenter.org/president/wilson/campaigns-and-elections [https://
perma.cc/E7SZ-9VZX] (last visited Jan. 22, 2022); William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 84 YALE L.J. 663, 664 (1974).
50. See Joseph F. Mahoney, Backsliding Convert: Woodrow Wilson and the “Seven
Sisters”, 18 AM. Q. 71, 71-73, (1966); Cary, supra note 49.
51. See Mahoney, supra note 50; Cary, supra note 49. See also Joel Seligman, A
Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249,
270 (1976); Grandy, supra note 44, at 687-88; Lyman Johnson, Dominance by Inaction:
Delaware’s Long Silence on Corporate Officers, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED?
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factor that only contributed to a process that was already underway. They
argue that “New Jersey was likely a victim of its own success,” since other
jurisdictions simply copied its legislation and reduced its competitive
advantage.52
In any event, by the end of the 1920s, the success of Delaware in
attracting incorporators was clear, and the gap between Delaware and
other states became more pronounced.53 Delaware’s dominance had
begun. Their success in the market for incorporation carried with it a preeminence in corporate law: the cases and opinions issued by Delaware’s
courts proliferated, and its corporate legislation became progressively
more elaborate.54
However, the true achievement of Delaware’s policy was the
consolidation of this dominance; a dominance that brings over a quarter
of state revenues through incorporation fees and franchise taxes,55 makes
Delaware’s lead unquestionable still today, and significantly affects the
evolution of corporate law, even outside the United States.56

EVALUATING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 182, 182 (Stephen M.
Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018); Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race Competition for
Corporate Charters and the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910, 32 J. CORP. L.
323, 324-26, 329 (2007); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted
Wound, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 851, 869 (2016); Charles M. Elson, Why Delaware Must
Retain Its Corporate Dominance and Why It May Not, in CAN DELAWARE BE
DETHRONED? EVALUATING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 225, 226
(Stephen M. Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018).
52. SANGA, supra note 25, at 5. Sanga emphasizes that New Jersey’s decline as the
leading site of incorporation began shortly after 1903—that is nearly a decade before the
Seven Sisters bills were passed and nearly seven years before Woodrow Wilson
campaigned for governor. According to this view, New Jersey’s earlier decline was
simply the result of the basic competition from other states which had copied its liberal
pre-1913 corporate legislation. Id. at 16-18. Sanga adds: “[L]iberal corporate laws were
specifically designed to attract out-of-state firms. Having clearly achieved that goal, they
were then simply copied by other states. For example, New Jersey’s holding company
statute–its signature creation–was copied by Pennsylvania, Maine, West Virginia, Ohio,
and others within a few years.” Id. at 5.
53. Another factor may be the proximity to New Jersey and to New York. See
SANGA, supra note 25, at 3.
54. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 75.
55. Financial Summary: Governor’s Recommended Budget, DEL. OFF. MGMT. 6, 6–
7, https://budget.delaware.gov/budget/fy2020/documents/operating/financial-summary.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5WWA-SB7V] (last visited Oct. 18, 2021).
56. See Brian Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate
Governance, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 75-76 (2015); Roberta Romano, The States as a
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B. STAYING POWER: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
1. Credible Commitment Theory and the Delaware Court System
Delaware succeeded exactly where New Jersey failed, in securing
and consolidating its leadership and thereby retaining its position. The
reason for this achievement is a combination of factors that is not easy to
replicate. The causes and consequences sometimes coincide or overlap
since some effects also become factors that support Delaware in
preserving its hegemony.57 As I articulated above, the explanations
provided for Delaware’s continuing success can be aligned into two key
theories: the credible commitment theory and the network theory.58
The credible commitment theory postulates that Delaware offers an
attractive blend of attributes and is committed towards corporations.59
Firstly, the state legislature pays specific attention to the business
community’s needs; and, in amending its legislation on corporations,
Delaware’s approach is prudent yet not conservative. The corporate bar
and corporate constituencies embraced the legislative process, fostering a
historic and reasonable relationship that makes the fortune of Delaware’s
corporate law.60
Secondly, the Delaware court system contributes decisively to this
success.61 Its courts have accumulated a considerable expertise over the
years and developed a large body of case law to resort to when
Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE
J. ON REGUL. 209, 246 (2006).
57. See, e.g., Brian J. Broughman & Darian M. Ibrahim, Delaware’s Familiarity, 52
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 273, 275 (2015).
58. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, 1 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 225, 276-78 (1985); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 9 (1993) [hereinafter ROMANO, THE GENIUS]. See also Peter
Molk, Delaware’s Dominance and the Future of Organizational Law, 55 GA. L. REV.
1111, 1114-17 (2021).
59. Id., at 1123.
60. The scholars supporting this theory usually hold that Delaware is relatively
immune from outside pressure to enact unbalanced rules. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The
Market for Corporate Law Redux, in 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
358, 388–90 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017). But cf. Bainbridge, supra note 51, at 870-75
(discussing the legislative prohibition of fee-shifting bylaws as the evidence of an
alteration of the healthy relationship between the corporate bar and the state government).
61. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition
for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2000).
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interpreting the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL).62 Delaware
has a separate, highly efficient court, the Court of Chancery, that is mainly
devoted to corporate law.63 Decisions are quick, predictable, and usually
relatively time sensitive.64 Since business flourishes and thrives in an
environment of predictability and certainty, this is a remarkably important
component of Delaware’s dominance in the corporate sector.65
What is more, Delaware case law is so influential that other
jurisdictions, even when adjudicating cases on corporations with no
connection to Delaware, show a deference to the Delaware courts’
authority.66 Like in a virtuous (or vicious) circle, this reinforces and
solidifies Delaware’s position.
Delaware has strong incentives to maintain the dynamic that
attracted incorporators because, among other things, it is interested in
retaining the revenue stream coming from incorporation fees and
franchise taxes.67 All these attributes make entrepreneurs, investors, and
lawyers believe that this jurisdiction is committed to supply responsive
corporate law also in the future.68 For managers and investors, who are a
naturally forward-looking “species,” Delaware’s reliability is a powerful
motivation to pick this jurisdiction as the state to incorporate.
Some commentators have argued that other factors might also be
crucial for Delaware’s dominance: the DGCL—the foundation on which
Delaware corporate law rests—is a very liberal statute. It does not provide
a detailed and prescriptive framework, but instead relies upon few
mandatory requirements and otherwise grants a wide range of flexibility
for corporations.69
62. See Johnson, supra note 51, at 241; Molk, supra note 58, at 1117 n.26, 1123
n.54, 1127 n.77.
63. Molk, supra note 58, at 1115-16.
64. Id. at 1116.
65. Id.
66. See Jens Dammann, Deference to Delaware Corporate Law Precedents and
Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Analysis 2 (May 30, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3384446 [https://perma.cc/VDK979NR]; William J. Moon, Delaware’s Global Competitiveness, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1683,
1696 (2021).
67. See Molk, supra note 58, at 1115.
68. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Debate on State Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J.
553, 584 (2002).
69. See Why Businesses Chose Delaware, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corplaw.
delaware.gov/why-businesses-choose-delaware/ [https://perma.cc/P9EM-J3K6] (last
visited Dec. 24, 2021).
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Additionally, Delaware’s courts have formulated, developed, and
virtually imposed on other jurisdictions some of the most notable
doctrines in American corporate law.70 These doctrines also set a very
pro-director corporate law that is highly desirable for incorporators.71 For
example, Delaware corporate law allows directors to comply with less
onerous duties than those imposed by English, German, French, or Italian
law.72 It is well known that, when a court applies the so-called business
judgment rule as the appropriate standard of judicial scrutiny, the plaintiff
is essentially required to allege and prove that the directors’ conduct
amounts to bad faith or waste.73 Otherwise, the court will refrain from
scrutinizing the business decision.74 No liability arises for losses caused
70. See Why Delaware Corporate Law Matters So Much, DELAWAREINC.COM,
https://www.delawareinc.com/blog/why-delaware-corporate-law-matters-so-much/
[https://perma.cc/NDX8-XHES] (last visited Dec. 24, 2021).
71. See, e.g., Gilchrist Sparks III & Daniel D. Matthews, Delaware’s Continued
Resilience: The Next Hundred Years, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED? EVALUATING
DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 238, 244-48 (Stephen M. Bainbridge et
al. eds., 2018); Leo E. Strine Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and
Some of The New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 675-76
(2006). This can become a determinant if a corporation elects to re-incorporate and needs
to choose the jurisdiction where to re-incorporate a decision about which directors play
an important role.
72. See Elson, supra note 51, at 237.
73. See Bernard S. Sharfman, The Importance of the Business Judgment Rule, 14
N.Y.U.J.L. & BUS. 27, 55 (2017).
74. There is a vast amount of case law and literature discussing the rule. See Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (defining the business judgment rule as the wellknown “presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company” and defining the business judgment rule as the
well-known “presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)
(explaining that the business decision will be “insulated” and protected from any judicial
second-guessing, as long as the board was not conflicted and, of course, unless the
plaintiff proves the absence of any rational business purpose). See also Joy v. North, 692
F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66,
74 (Del. 2006); William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of
Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. L. 1287, 1289 (2001);
Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t a Rule - The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL.
U. L. REV. 631, 632 (2002); Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the
Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty,
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by imprudence or honest errors of judgment.75 However, even when the
court in Smith v. Van Gorkom held that business judgment rule did not
apply to gross errors such as the hasty actions of an ill-informed board,76
the Delaware legislature passed a statute eliminating directors’ liability
for negligence.77 As a further example, the much-debated shareholder
value doctrine78 is also a product of Delaware’s dominance.
Some also contend that Delaware’s dominance is in part a
“dominance by inaction.”79 This evocative expression refers to
Delaware’s long silence on a central aspect of corporate governance: the
duties and liability pertaining to executive corporate officers.80 Delaware
has never clarified some basic legal issues on this topic, such as whether
the business judgment rule applies to officers; whether the
Unocal/Unitrin or Revlon test applies to officers;81 which standard of care
is the appropriate one for officers; why shareholders can bring direct
actions to corporate officers if they are employees and agents of the
company but not if they are shareholders.82

66 MD. L. REV. 398, 401 (2007); Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Fiduciary Duties in Business
Entities Revisited, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 923, 935 (2013).
75. See Sharfman, supra note 73, at 33.
76. 488 A.2d 858, 864 (Del. 1985).
77. See Stephen A. Radin, The Director’s Duty of Care Three Years after Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 707, 711 (1988); Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of
Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the
Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 676, 680 (2002); Bernard S. Sharfman,
The Enduring Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 287, 288 (2008).
78. According to which directors’ primary duty is to maximize the value of
corporation for the benefit of stockholders and not of stakeholders. See, e.g., Lucian A.
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 910
(2005); Randall Morck, The Social Value of Shareholder Value, 22 CORP. GOv.: INTL’L
REV. 185, 192 (2014).
79. Johnson, supra note 51.
80. Id.
81. Id. In a vast majority of cases, courts explicitly refer to ‘boards’ and ‘directors’,
not to officers. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 949 (Del. 1985) (“The
factual findings of the Vice Chancellor, fully supported by the record, establish that
Unocal’s board, consisting of a majority of independent directors, acted . . . in the proper
exercise of sound business judgement”); Unitrin Inc. v. American General Corp., 651
A.2d 1366 (1995) (“The Court of Chancery should have directed its enhanced scrutiny:
first, upon whether the Repurchase Program the Unitrin’s Board was draconian . . . .”);
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 175 (1986) (“The actions
taken by the Revlon directors, however, did not meet this standard.”).
82. See Johnson, supra note 51, at 183-88.
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Although it might sound ironic, this statutory and case law silence
has arguably contributed to Delaware’s historical predominance. By
articulating very little on officer-related issues, Delaware has allowed
directors and officers to largely address the matter in other, more desirable
ways, mainly through ex-ante employment agreements and ex-post
severance arrangements.83 This has served Delaware’s dominance so well
that, even if the state legislature and courts turned to a more regulatory
approach in the future, Delaware’s long-established pre-eminence would
hardly be affected.84
2. “Network” Theory and “Delaware Trap” Argument
The network theory is equally captivating and sheds further light on
Delaware’s staying power. Like the credible commitment theory, the
network theory holds that Delaware’s reputation is a critical factor, but
for a less optimistic reason. The network theory refers to the lock-in effect
created by popularity in the market for corporate charters and posits that
a jurisdiction, once it has attracted a critical mass of incorporations,
becomes more attractive for subsequent company formations.85 This
subsequent attraction does not necessarily relate to the quality of the law
delivered by that jurisdiction.86 Thus, Delaware has achieved a dominant
position and, under this theory, now benefits from the “sticky” nature of
incorporation decisions.87

83.
84.
85.

Id. at 184.
Id. at 183-84.
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts,
81 VA. L. REV. 757, 813 (1995); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1923 (1998). See also S. J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 133, 134-35 (1994); Molk, supra note 58, at 1117; Sarath Sanga, Network
Effects in Corporate Governance, 63 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (2020).
86. See Sanga, supra note 85, at 2.
87. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Introduction: Can Delaware Be Dethroned?
Evaluating Delaware’s Dominance of Corporate Law, in CAN DELAWARE BE
DETHRONED? EVALUATING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 1, 5 (Stephen
M. Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018); Robert IV Anderson, The Delaware Trap: An Empirical
Analysis of Incorporation Decisions, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 694-96, 710 (2018).
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An argument stemming from this theory emphasizes how lawyers
play a major role in a client’s choice over the state of incorporation.88 In
law school, students learn Delaware corporate law and sometimes that of
their home state.89 In order to minimize learning costs, lawyers tend to
advise Delaware incorporation regardless of the quality of legal rules or
the needs of the client.90 This creates a closed loop, where lawyers choose
Delaware to incorporate clients’ businesses because they learned
Delaware corporate law in law schools; and law schools teach Delaware
corporate law because most corporations choose Delaware as its
jurisdiction.91 This cycle of efficiency, perhaps also of mediocrity, works
as a “trap” into which corporations inadvertently fall and from which
reincorporation out of state is nearly impossible.92
The implications are quite interesting: demographic markers of
sophistication, such as the use and choice of law firm or headquarters
location, can predict the jurisdictional incorporation choice better than
any other factor.93 Accordingly, the home state or the business attributes
of the firm are less crucial in predicting the jurisdiction where a company
will register.94 Companies with more demographic markers of
sophistication tend to choose Delaware incorporation, while companies
with fewer demographic markers of sophistication are inclined to
incorporate in their home-state.95 A national legal counsel is likely to
choose Delaware; a local might go for a local incorporation.96 This makes
the competition in the charters market a feud between the company’s
home state on one side and Delaware on the other.
There is another implication of the network theory: if the quality of
legal rules or the needs of the client do not drive the decision, the
corporate charters competition no longer depends upon the attributes of a
88. See Bainbridge, supra note 87; Anderson, supra note 87, at 694-95; Molk, supra
note 58, at 1128-29. See also William J. Carney et al., Lawyers, Ignorance, and the
Dominance of Delaware Corporate Law, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 123, 148 (2012).
89. See Bainbridge, Introduction, supra note 87, at 6; Molk, supra note 58, at 112829; Anderson, supra note 87, at 694-95, 708-09.
90. Molk, supra note 58, at 1128-29, 1132; Bainbridge, supra note 87.
91. Bainbridge, supra note 87, at 6. See also Molk, supra note 58, at 1128-29.
92. See Anderson, supra note 87, at 694-95, 708-09. See also Bainbridge, supra note
87, at 6.
93. See Anderson, supra note 87, at 694-95.
94. Id. at 657-58. This empirical research was conducted on a large dataset of
corporate financings. The data are consistent regardless of the industry classification, the
amount of money raised, or whether the company is public or private. Id. at 682-93.
95. Id. at 695-99.
96. Id. at 702-03.
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jurisdiction and does not push competitors to do better.97 This means that
Delaware’s position in the market for corporate charters has eliminated
any meaningful competition over the quality of corporate law among the
jurisdictions.98 It also means that any doctrinal shifts or amendments in
Delaware legislation would only marginally affect the decision of
incorporating in Delaware and the resulting dominance.
This does not necessarily imply that Delaware is free to enact poor
quality or unbalanced corporate law without paying the consequences.
There is always the federal “threat,” which I will canvass in due course.
Additionally, should a new competitor provide an incentive strong
enough for a corporation to incorporate outside of Delaware and prevail
against the “sticky” 99 nature of the incorporation choice, competition
might revive.
C. THE RACE-TO-THE-TOP / RACE-TO-THE-BOTTOM DEBATE
The credible commitment theory and the network theory are
intertwined and sometimes overlap. Yet, the credible commitment theory
more often concludes that the competition resulting in Delaware’s
dominance is a race to the top, meaning that the corporate charters market
has induced jurisdictions to deliver balanced and efficient corporate law.
By contrast, the network theory is more inclined towards the race-to-thebottom position and implies that Delaware is just producing corporate law
to appease managers.100 However, both theories predict that Delaware is
destined to remain the preferred jurisdiction for incorporations.101
Whether Delaware is prevailing in a “race to the bottom” or a “race
to the top” is a question that has been debated for decades. Some argue
that the competition to attract incorporators has facilitated the emergence
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 703-05; Molk, supra note 58.
See Anderson, supra note 87, at 703-05.
Id., at 710 (using the expression “sticky status quo jurisdictions”).
See Cary, supra note 49, at 663, 666 (denouncing the efficiency argument and
specifically defining it as a regime benefitting managers). Cf. Daniel R. Fischel, The
“Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s
Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919-20 (1982). See also Lucian A. Bebchuk,
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1440 (1992); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar,
The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 681 (2002);
Greenfield, supra note 2, at 135-39.
101. See Cary, supra note 49, at 663, 666; Fischel, supra note 100.

2022]

DELAWARE'S DOMINANCE, WYOMING'S DARE

93

of large conglomerates, able to organize a complicated network to control
businesses through stock ownership and interlocking directorates. 102 That
consolidation reached a peak at the turn of the 20th century,103 before
antitrust legislation started to operate effectively.104 Since then, the issue
has been addressed, and Delaware cannot be blamed for conglomerates’
rise any more than competition of the charters market.
That said, resolving the race-to-the-bottom/race-to-the-top dilemma
is crucial in assessing the result of Delaware’s dominance and
understanding whose interests this hegemony is serving.
Some commentators contend that Delaware won a race to the bottom
and continues to prevail in a contest to provide management-friendly
legislation and case law, since it has a strong interest in retaining its
dominance and is very focused in appeasing incorporators.105 The
Delaware State Bar Association and other interest groups lobby the
legislature, which, in turn, enacts statutes that essentially allow managers
to exploit shareholders. 106
Others argue that this competition cannot be a race to the bottom,
since investors would never purchase securities of a company
incorporated in a jurisdiction where managers can abuse their powers

102. See M. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era, AM. J.
LEG. HIST. 160, 166-68 (1982); ERIC J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF CAPITAL 1848-1875
247-51 (1997).
103. The story of the U.S. Steel Corporation and J.P. Morgan is an example: after
succeeding to his father Junius, he took over a re-organisation of railroads, exploited the
opportunities offered by the most profitable legislation available and created a voting
trust. In few years, he was controlling all the railroads in the nation, most of its mines,
and other manufacturing companies. His corporation became the first billion-dollar
corporation in the world, encompassing finance, industry, fuel, and transport See
TALBOT, supra note 15, at 16. A similar case was Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company,
a conglomerate which became the centre of the whole petroleum industry. Id. See also
LEVY, supra note 11, at 285; HOBSBAWM, supra note 102, at 260-69.
104. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. For application, see the so-called
“Sugar Trust Case,” United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). The protection
of investors was famously advocated for by Louis D. Brandeis, whose campaign exposed
distortions and abuses associated with the rise and dominance of financial capital. LOUIS
D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 4-8 (18th ed.
1993).
105. For the seminal argument of the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, see Cary, supra
note 49, at 663, 705.
106. Id. On the influence of interest group on Delaware corporate law, see Johnathan
R. Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate
Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 (1987).
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without consequence.107 Similarly, they argue, moneylenders would never
lend money to a company incorporated in states where managers are
hardly accountable.108 In other words, according to these commentators,
a corporation incorporated under an undesirably unbalanced corporate
law would discourage investors, cause the price of its shares to decline,
and force the company to pay higher interest rates.109 This would also
make said corporation less profitable and more vulnerable to hostile
takeovers, which would result in the replacement of managers—as the
ultimate consequence of a bad decision regarding the incorporation
place.110
Therefore, it is thought, the competition for corporate charters deters
managers from selecting a jurisdiction that provides bad corporate law,
and state legislatures from adopting excessively pro-management laws.111
Instead, this mechanism promotes the selection of an efficient corporate
law, since it motivates managers to incorporate where the law is efficient
and balanced.112
The dichotomy between the race to the top and the race to the bottom
is actually an oversimplification. The truth probably lies somewhere in
the middle. Both positions rely on some faulty premises. For instance, it
is arguable that takeovers and their regulation are an efficient monitoring
mechanism that replaces managers each time they make bad business
decisions (such as a bad choice on where to incorporate) and fail to keep
the share price high.113
107. The traditional statement of the race-to-the-top theory (and the classic response
to Cary), is found in Ralph K. Winter Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-58 (1977).
108. Id. at 255-57. On the contrary, this race enables firms to “seek the state whose
code best matches their needs so as to minimize their cost of doing business.” ROMANO,
THE GENIUS, supra note 58, at 1.
109. Winter Jr., supra note 107.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., F. M. Scherer, Corporate Takeovers: The Efficiency Arguments, 2 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 69, 79 (1988); Simon Deakin & Giles Slinger, Hostile Takeovers,
Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm, 24 J.L. & SOC’Y 124, 127 (1997); Marina
Martynova & Luc Renneboog, A Century of Corporate Takeovers: What Have We
Learned and Where Do We Stand?, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 2148, 2172-73 (2008); B.
Espen Eckbo, Corporate Takeovers and Economic Efficiency, 6 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON.
51, 52 (2014); Nihat Aktas et al., Corporate Governance and Takeover Outcomes, 24
REV. CORP. GOV.: INT’L REV. 242, 245 (2016).
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Moreover, the story of states strongly competing to attract
incorporators and “steal” tax revenues away from Delaware is far from
reality.114 Theoretically, a jurisdiction might offer inducements such as
tax regimes or statutes whose terms are attractive to those who make the
incorporation (or re-incorporation) decision.115 In practice, Delaware
usually anticipates the adoption of a regulation that is valued by
incorporators or can swiftly replicate any appealing provision that is
introduced by other jurisdictions.116 By contrast, the business
environment that Delaware can offer, including the expertise of its courts
and legislature, cannot be reproduced by other states in the short term and
without significant costs.117
In fact, Delaware has effectively discouraged other jurisdictions or
neutralized their efforts. With very few exceptions,118 other states
compete just to retain local incorporations, while Delaware attracts
incorporators from all over the United States.119 To put it another way, to
the extent there is a competition, it is between the company’s home state
on one side, and, always, Delaware on the other.120 Not to mention that, if
the Delaware “trap” argument is grounded and the quality of legal rules
does not affect the decision on the incorporation place, both sides in the
“race” debate are focusing on the wrong issue.121
Something else is keeping Delaware on the path of efficiency and
away from a race towards an exploitative corporate law. It might be true
that Delaware courts and lawmakers attempt to avoid a bad run of
legislation or case law since, as the Seven Sisters package of laws proved,
it could trigger—or contribute to—a massive migration and end
Delaware’s dominance.122 But more importantly, if this jurisdiction
tolerated blatant abuses from managers to the detriment of its
shareholders or damaged the national economy, the federal legislature
could not refrain from intervening—especially in these current times of
114.
115.
116.

See Bainbridge, supra note 87, at 4.
See ROMANO, THE GENIUS, supra note 58, at 4.
Christopher M. Bruner, Leveraging Corporate Law: A Broader Account of
Delaware’s Competition, 80 MD. L. REV. 72, 81 (2020).
117. See ROMANO, THE GENIUS, supra note 58, at 54-55.
118. See infra Section III.A.
119. See ROMANO, THE GENIUS, supra note 58, at 213; Bainbridge, supra note 87, at
4.
120. See ROMANO, THE GENIUS, supra note 58; Bainbridge, supra note 87, at 4.
121. See Anderson, supra note 87, at 703.
122. See Elson, supra note 51, at 225-26. See also Sparks III & Matthews, supra note
71, at 256-59.
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crisis and criticism.123 Thus, some commentators view the tradition of the
federal legislature intervening after a crisis or in the face of a gross
distortion as further evidence that the race-to-the-bottom/race-to-the-top
debate is substantially misconceived.124
Delaware is aware that the Congress, if provoked, could take over
significant corporate law sectors.125 Thus, the market for corporate law is
not a competition among states but rather between the federal government
and Delaware, where “Delaware gets to say the words, but only as long
as the federal authorities tolerate its script.”126 When key issues attract
media attention or public anxiety, the federal government intervenes.127
As long as the issue stays in Delaware, this dynamic favors state-level
deals between managers and investors, excluding outside interest
groups—such as unions and other public interest groups that would
otherwise be involved in a federal legislative process.128
Therefore, the process underlying Delaware’s dominance is hardly a
free race to the top or bottom. Instead, it appears to be the search for a
balance of interests and for a compromise between corporate
constituencies, which takes place under the threat of a federal intrusion.
In light of this, Delaware has a strong incentive not to abuse its leading
position; that is, to keep the federal legislature at arm’s length, the debate
must remain technical, local, and without broad political concerns.
This view emphasizes that Delaware is under constant federal threat,
despite its preeminent role among the jurisdictions. 129 Perhaps this does
not guarantee the selection of the most efficient law, but at least it keeps
state corporate law in check.
123.
124.

See infra Section III.C.
See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591-92
(2003). See also Mark J. Roe, Regulatory Competition in Making Corporate Law in the
United States - and Its Limits, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 232, 233-34 (2005); Marcel
Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 679, 748 (2002); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State
Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1820-1821 (2002); Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1793, 1798-1800 (2006).
125. See Bruner, supra note 116, at 75.
126. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 124, at 591 (“If fundamental issues of
corporate governance often move into federal area, then Delaware is not deciding all key
corporate law matters.”).
127. Id. at 600.
128. Id. at 641.
129. Id. at 591-92.
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III. OLD AND RECURRING CHALLENGES
A. NEVADA: THE TRADITIONAL CONTENDER
Within the illustrated context, a successful challenge to Delaware’s
dominance from another state is predictably difficult, requires significant
effort, and usually fizzles out.
The cases of North Dakota and Connecticut exemplify this idea. In
2007, North Dakota adopted the Publicly Traded Corporations Act,130
which was designed to “improve the performance of publicly traded
corporations” and attract incorporators.131 As predicted by some
commentators,132 the strategy failed to achieve any significant results, and
after a few years the state gave up on its ambitions.133 Connecticut’s
130.
131.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35 (2007).
See NORTH DAKOTA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF THE
NORTH DAKOTA PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS ACT 1 (2007), https://www.law.
du.edu/images/uploads/corporate-governance/legislation-nd-explanation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/969A-ZJVV]. As gathered by Stephen M. Bainbridge, the idea
underlying the law was presumably that North Dakota would have attracted
“incorporations away from Delaware by becoming more shareholder-friendly than
Delaware.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why the North Dakota Publicly Traded
Corporations Act Will Fail, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (2008). See also, Mark J. Roe,
Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125, 146 (2009); Joshua P. Fershee,
The North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act: A Branding Initiative Without a
(North Dakota) Brand, 84 N.D.L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2008); Larry Ribstein, The North
Dakota Experiment, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGUL., (Apr. 23,
2007), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2007/04/23/the-north-dakota-experiment/ [https:
//perma.cc/PQ85-QUPG].
132. See Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 1045-46, arguing that North Dakota would
have inevitably lose the challenge, no matter whether state competition was a race to the
top or to the bottom. In fact, if state competition was a race to the bottom—in which
Delaware prevails by catering to management interests at the expense of shareholders—
North Dakota’s Publicly Traded Corporations Act would have deterred managers from
(re)incorporating in that jurisdiction, since it would have limited their ability to extract
private rents. If state competition was a race to the top and investors valued the
shareholder-friendly provisions of the North Dakota Act, “Delaware would have gotten
there first.” Id. at 1047. However, since North Dakota’s statute offered to replace the
efficient and long-established system of director primacy with an inefficient consensusbased decision-making structure, the challenge was doomed to fail. Id. at 1046. See also
Roe, supra note 131, at 148 (“North Dakota has a competitive corporate law—a different
product—in place, but it lacks both a base of North Dakota corporations and welldeveloped corporate law courts.” Arguably, a lack precluding North Dakota from being
able to meaningfully compete with Delaware).
133. See Ribstein, supra note 131.
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challenge lasted an even shorter period of time. In 2014, the state
legislature announced an agenda to “create a 10-year plan to challenge
and eventually overtake Delaware as the leading state in the country for
businesses and corporations to locate, incorporate and do business.”134
After less than a year, Connecticut concluded that Delaware was too hard
(and probably too expensive) to dethrone and abandoned the plan.135
The only competitors that achieved some results were Nevada and,
to a certain extent, Maryland and Pennsylvania.136 In particular, Nevada
turned out to be more resilient than any other contender. Its strategy was
aggressive and distinctive, consisting of a mix of “shockingly lax
corporate law” and tax regimes.137 In Nevada, directors and officers are
generally protected from liability for breaches of fiduciary duties.138
Scholars pointed out that:
Nevada has shielded corporate actors from liability for various acts
and omissions, allowing officers and directors to avoid liabilities that
are considered almost axiomatic, such as those for breaches of the
duty of loyalty, acts or omissions not in good faith, and transactions
from which an officer or a director derived an improper personal
benefit.139

The purpose of this extreme leniency is no mystery. On the contrary,
Nevada conspicuously advertised and emphasized that its law protected
director and officer conduct in situations where Delaware law left them
134.
135.
136.

See Molk, supra note 58, at 1113-14.
Id. at 1114.
See Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting
into Lax Law, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 3593, 3593 (2014) (noting that Nevada is the “secondmost popular state for out-of-state incorporations”). See generally Edwin J. Bradley, A
Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corporation Statutes,
1968 DUKE L. J. 525 (1968); Robert C. Martin, A Comparison of the Pennsylvania and
Delaware Corporation Statutes, 89 DICK. L. REV. 809 (1985).
137. See Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a LiabilityFree Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935, 935 (2012). See also Sarath Sanga, Choice of Law:
An Empirical Analysis, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 894, 919-20 (2014) (noting that
Nevada is a “liability-free” jurisdiction); Ofer Eldar, Can Lax Corporate Law Increase
Shareholder Value? Evidence from Nevada, 61 J.L. & ECON. 555, 555-56 (2018)
(discussing Nevada’s “lax corporate law”); Ofer Eldar & Lorenzo Magnolfi, Regulatory
Competition and the Market for Corporate Law, 12 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 60,
60-61, 72 (2020).
138. See Barzuza, supra note 137, at 941.
139. Id.
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exposed.140 “Nevada has all but hung up a ‘no law for sale’ sign,”
suggested a commentator.141 Nevada even posted a number of reasons to
incorporate in Nevada rather than in Delaware on a website that it owns
and runs (whynevada.com).142 Among these reasons, it explicitly referred
to stronger protections from personal liability for directors and officers. 143
In truth, Nevada’s 1987 exculpation statute was originally broader
than Delaware’s, and allowed companies to waive liability for all
categories but one: intentional misconduct, fraud, or knowing violation of
law.144 Yet, the liability exemption operated with an opt-in mechanism,
since it required shareholder approval to apply.145
In 2001, Nevada passed an amendment to its legislation and flipped
its default rule from liability to no liability.146 Possibly, it relied on the

140.
141.

Id.
Id. (citing Harry First, Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware
Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 861 (1969)).
142. WHY NEVADA, http://www.whynevada.com [https://perma.cc/V4TB-V9VC]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
143. The website’s campaign was amplified by other websites that encouraged
incorporation in Nevada by enumerating the acts for which officers and directors would
be protected under Nevada law and exposed under Delaware law. See Barzuza, supra
note 137, at 941. Nowadays, the same website (whynevada.com) showcases a different
strategy and focuses on the gambling market.
144. See Barzuza, supra note 137, at 951-52.
145. Id. at 952. According to Eldar, in a sample of firms incorporated in Nevada in
2001, almost 40 percent did not opt in to the fullest extent of liability protection that
legislation already permitted for managers prior to the amendment. See Eldar, supra note
137, at 580.
146. See Barzuza, supra note 137, at 953. Also adding that:
In one day, all of Nevada’s directors and officers were granted
protection from most sources of liability. Shareholders could continue
to avoid protection and subject directors and officers to liability for
breach of the duty of loyalty, but only if they were able to secure the
approval of management. This change was not specifically approved
by the shareholders of Nevada companies. The legislation applied to
all of Nevada’s existing companies. Thus, shareholders who chose
Nevada incorporation prior to the change in the law were forced to
accept significant liability protections for directors and officers.
Id. at 953.
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inclination of firms to almost never opt out of default provisions that
benefit managers.147
Before the state legislature passed the amendment to broaden this
protection and become a truly liability-free jurisdiction, the strategy was
debated, and the potential consequences denounced.148 However, the
amendment was enacted just on the assumption that offering a highly
permissive law was necessary to differentiate Nevada from Delaware and
attract incorporators.149
As a result, Nevada did increase its market share of publicly-traded
firms, which rose by 20 percent, followed by a rise of more than 10,000
percent in its corporate tax revenues.150 It also gained the label of liabilityfree jurisdiction151.
The policy underlying this strategy was clear and openly pursued.
Nevada intended to carve out and become the leader of a specific segment
of the corporate charters market: namely, that of firms with a preference
for a no-liability regime concerning directors and officers152. Crucially,
this is a market segment that Delaware had not targeted.
There were two additional factors that, combined with this strategy,
allowed Nevada to consolidate the relative success achieved. First,
Delaware could not follow Nevada on the path of a very permissive law.
Otherwise, the impact would have been so significant that it would have
invited federal intervention in order to halt the United States from
becoming a no-liability harbor for directors153. Some commentators
presented evidence that Nevada’s approach does not harm shareholder
value, particularly in small firms with low institutional shareholding and
high insider ownership.154 This is because Nevada’s pro-managerial
legislation reduces the “likelihood of takeovers and litigation, thereby
147. See Eldar & Magnolfi, supra note 137, at 11 (citing Yair Listokin, What do
Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical Analysis, 6 J. EMPIRICAL. LEGAL
STUD. 279, 279, 295 (2009)).
148. See Barzuza, supra note 137, at 953-54.
149. Id. at 953, 955.
150. Id. at 942. The argument that Nevada’s low taxes are the true reason for its
attractiveness is not persuasive. “[A]lthough Nevada’s tax rate is significantly lower than
Delaware’s, it is significantly higher than the rates of other states.” Id. at 974.
151. See Barzuza, supra note 137, at 935.
152. Id. at 935.
153. Id. at 943.
154. See Eldar, supra note 137, at 555; Eldar & Magnolfi, supra note 137, at 65, 9293.
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benefiting a segment of small firms for which the costs of corporate
governance may outweigh the benefits.”155 Clearly, a similar approach
would get a different outcome in Delaware, where most large corporations
have their registered offices, and the federal legislature would necessarily
intervene156.
The second factor that favored Nevada’s successful consolidation of
its niche was its open commitment to the liability-free policy157. This
commitment demonstrated to incorporators that Nevada would continue
to provide permissive laws of this kind in the future158. To put it
differently, Nevada’s commitment was so credible that it encouraged
firms looking for this kind of safe harbor to incorporate or move there.
However, the policy of market segmentation was also a limit to
Nevada’s success, as it made Nevada competitive only for that niche
market. In truth, Nevada predominantly attracted small firms.159
Understandably, institutional investors would be deterred from investing
in a corporation registered in a jurisdiction with Nevada’s characteristics,
severely limiting its appeal to larger corporation.160
Some commentators contend that recent developments might
increase Nevada’s attractiveness.161 In an opinion issued on March 25,
2021, the Nevada Supreme Court held that a plaintiff cannot rebut the
business judgment rule as a matter of law simply by alleging that a
director was an interested party.162 In this regard, the court concluded that
NRS 78.138(7), the local corporation statute, precludes the “inherent
fairness standard” as adopted in an earlier case, Foster v. Arata:163
155.
156.
157.

See Eldar, supra note 68, at 555.
See Barzuza, supra note 137, at 967.
See Eldar & Magnolfi, supra note 137, at 72; Barzuza, supra note 137, at 966.
See also Roe, supra note 124, at 636.
158. See Barzuza, supra note 137, at 943.
159. See Eldar, supra note 137, at 555; Eldar & Magnolfi, supra note 137, at 62, 66,
92.
160. Eldar & Magnolfi, supra note 137, at 93.
161. See Yolanda C. Garcia et al., Nevada Splits from Delaware, Applies Business
Judgment Rule Broadly, LEXOLOGY (May 27, 2021), https://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=8327a48d-d171-40a3-99a8-5d78811630a0
[https://perma.cc/R8NL-59CC].
162. Guzman v. Johnson, 483 P.3d 531, 533-34 (Nev. 2021).
163. 325 P.2d 759, 765 (Nev. 1958) (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306
(1939)).
A director is a fiduciary . . . . Their powers are in trust. Their dealings
with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any
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As is well known, under Foster the mere allegation that a director was
an interested party in the transaction rebuts the business judgment rule
and requires the director to prove the inherent fairness of the deal. 164
In contrast, NRS 78.138(7) provides that the plaintiff must establish a
breach involving intentional misconduct, fraud, or a knowing
violation of law. Therefore, in Guzman, the court argued that if the
mere allegation were sufficient to shift the burden of proof and trigger
the inherent fairness standard, the express provisions of NRS
78.138(7) would be meaningless.165

Not only does Guzman confirm the Nevada Supreme Court’s
director-friendly position, but it renders unlikely the application of a
review standard stricter than the business judgment rule in Nevada.166
This is a marked difference from the Delaware courts, which are inclined
of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged
the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to prove the good
faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the
viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein.
Id. See also Chur v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 458 P.3d 336, 340-41 (Nev. 2020);
Guzman, 483 P.3d at 532.
164. See Guzman, 483 P.3d at 533-34.
165. Id. at 537. There, the court also noted that “NRS 78.138(7) plainly requires the
plaintiff to both rebut the business judgment rule’s presumption of good faith and show
a breach of fiduciary duty involving intentional misconduct, fraud, or a knowing violation
of the law. The statute’s language is straightforward and must be given effect.” As
remarked in Chur, the Guzman court added that the NRS 78.138(7) “provides the sole
method for holding individual directors liable for corporate decisions.” See Chur, 458
P.3d at 339; Guzman, 483 P.3d at 535. Therefore, unless the plaintiff had not pled facts
showing that the relevant directors were motivated by self-interest, the business judgment
rule would apply. In Guzman, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s
complaint. Id. at 540. See also Kelsey DeLozier, Guzman v. Johnson, 137 Nev. Adv. Op.
13 (Mar. 25, 2021), 4 NEVADA SUPREME COURT SUMMARIES 1400 (2021).
166. Guzman at 534. The court stated that:
We now clarify that NRS 78.138 and Chur control, foreclosing the
inherent fairness standard that previously allowed a shareholder to
automatically rebut the business judgment rule and shift the burden of
proof to the director. Further, because Guzman failed to rebut the
business judgment rule and allege particularized facts demonstrating
the requisite breach of fiduciary duty, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of her complaint.
Id.
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to apply the entire fairness review at the mere presence of a controller on
both sides of a merger—unless the transaction meets the MFW test.167
Nevertheless, the implications in terms of the market for corporate
charters are questionable. The Nevada Supreme Court’s doctrinal shift is
consistent with the state’s traditional strategy and, consequently, might
encounter the limits already illustrated with respect to large
corporations.168
That said, Nevada’s market segmentation policy generates insights
that can be used to investigate and understand Wyoming’s strategy and
potential to challenge Delaware’s dominance. Wyoming is replicating the
logic behind Nevada’s approach, although on a different market niche.
Essentially, Wyoming is attempting to operate a market segmentation
with reference to blockchain and capture said segment. A comparison
between both States’ initiatives reveals that Wyoming is enacting many
of the strategies successfully implemented by Nevada and applying
untested measures that enhance its chance at success.
B. MIGRATION OF LITIGATION OUT OF DELAWARE: A SELF-INFLICTED
WOUND?
It is a known fact that U.S. corporate law adopts a regulation-bylitigation model.169 It relies heavily upon private lawsuits to police both
potential conflicts and disclosures, particularly in M&A.170 In a
regulation-by-litigation model, the monopoly over adjudication is
essential to retain the leading role in the relevant sector.171 Thus, it is

167. As is well known, in a transaction where the presence of controlling stockholder
would imply the application of the entire fairness standard, the business judgment rule
will apply anyway if the transaction was structured ab initio as to meet to the MFW test
and in its execution did satisfy said test. See infra note 184.
168. See Barzuza, supra note 137, at 959.
169. See Dan Awrey Blanaid Clarke & Sean J. Griffith, Resolving the Crisis in U.S.
Merger Regulation: A Transatlantic Alternative to the Perpetual Litigation Machine,
35 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 10, 57 (2018); Pierluigi Matera & Ferruccio M. Sbarbaro, From
Trulia to Akorn: A Ride on the Roller Coaster of M&A Litigation, 44 DEL. J. CORP. L.
61, 64-66, 104-09 (2020).
170. See Dan Awrey et al., Resolving the Crisis in U.S. Merger Regulation: A
Transatlantic Alternative to the Perpetual Litigation Machine, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1,
10, 57 (2018); Matera & Sbarbaro, supra note 169, 64-66.
171. Matera & Sbarbaro, supra note 169, at 65. More generally, on the role of the
enforcement, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 235-44 (1979).
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crucial for Delaware to issue a conspicuous number of opinions and
maintain other courts’ traditional deference to its authority.172
In 2012, some commentators noted a gradual erosion of Delaware’s
dominance in corporate law.173 Relying on four separate data sets,174 they
demonstrated a decline in the Delaware courts’ market share of cases and
opinions.175 Among other points, they emphasized a trend toward suits
being filed outside Delaware in both large M&A and leveraged buyout
(LBO) transactions, and in cases generating opinions.176 The same
commentators also found evidence that the “timing of specific Delaware
court decisions that affected plaintiffs’ firms coincides with the
movement of cases out of Delaware.”177
This movement is because Delaware courts periodically address
overlitigation; accordingly, they adopt new standards and rules to reduce
the incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring lawsuits before a Delaware
court.178 Each time this occurs, plaintiffs’ attorneys react by filing claims
in other jurisdictions.179 Usually, Delaware courts and the state legislature
adapt accordingly so as to halt the migration and retain their leading
position in adjudication.
This same chain of events recurred more recently when, in a line of
cases, Delaware courts responded to the excess of M&A litigation.180 The
decision in C&J Energy Services v. Miami made it more difficult to award
plaintiffs with an injunction for enjoining the transaction and

172.
173.

See Dan Awrey et al., supra note 170, at 57.
See John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 605, 605 (2012). See also Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger
Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 607 (2018); Thompson, supra note 6.
174. Namely: “(1) large M&A and (2) leveraged buyout transactions over 1994–2010;
(3) derivative suits alleging option backdating; and (4) cases against public company
directors that generate one or more publicly available opinions between 1995 and 2009.”
Armour et al., supra note 173.
175. Id. at 625. “It shows a steady drop in Delaware’s share of suits involving
Delaware companies undergoing LBOs. During the late 1990s, a large majority of these
suits were filed in Delaware. This proportion first fell below 50 percent in 2005 and has
generally continued to fall since then.” Id.
176. The evidence suggested that both serious and nuisance cases were leaving
Delaware. Id. at 605.
177. Id. That is the result of an adaptive response by plaintiffs’ attorneys.
178. See Matera & Sbarbaro, supra note 169, at 71-72.
179. Id. at 78.
180. Id. at 66-68.
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consequently reduced the incentive for pre-closing litigation.181 Similarly,
the courts in Trulia, Walgreen, and Akorn ruled that they would no longer
approve disclosure—only settlements or mootness fees when such
agreements only procure “worthless benefits for the class” of
shareholders bringing the action—this also reduced the incentive to file a
vexatious lawsuit.182 In Corwin v. KRR Financial Holdings, a post-closing
action, the court held that the business judgment rule is the appropriate
standard of judicial scrutiny even in a Revlon context, provided that the
merger was approved by a “fully informed, uncoerced majority of the
disinterested stockholders.”183 In Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., the
court stated that the business judgment rule, rather than the entire fairness
standard, applies to a controlling stockholder transaction each time the
transaction is “conditioned ab initio upon both the approval of an
independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee [of directors] . .
. and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority
stockholders.”184
Some argued that this series of decisions made Delaware
“remarkably less desirable for plaintiffs’ attorneys,” and triggered a
migration of litigation to more tolerant jurisdictions and eventually called
181.
182.

107 A.3d 1049, 1067-71 (Del. 2014).
See In re Trulia Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898-99 (Del. Ch. 2016); In re
Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 723-24 (7th Cir. 2016); House v. Akorn,
385 F. Supp. 3d 616, 623 (N.D. Ill. 2019). See also Matera & Sbarbaro, supra note 169,
at 62.
183. 125 A.3d 304, 306, 312-14 (Del. 2015). After an initial surge, the trend on the
cleansing effect under Corwin is relentlessly declining: in 2016 to 2017 the cleansing
effect was granted fourteen times out of nineteen cases (data refer to publicly announced
mergers litigated under Corwin whose decisions were published); in 2018 six cases out
of seven the Corwin effect was denied; the trend continues along 2019 and 2020.
184. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644-45 (Del. 2014). The case
holds that the business judgement rule applies:
[I]f and only if: (i) the controller conditions the procession of the
transaction on the approval of both a Special Committee and a
majority of the minority stockholders; (ii) the Special Committee is
independent; (iii) the Special Committee is empowered to freely select
its own advisors and to say no definitively; (iv) the Special Committee
meets its duty of care in negotiating a fair price; (v) the vote of the
minority is informed; and (vi) there is no coercion of the minority.
Id. at 645. See also Pierluigi Matera & Ferruccio M. Sbarbaro, Cleansing Effect e
Standard di Judicial Review nella Recente Giurisprudenza Statunitense, 1
COMPARAZIONE DIRITTO CIVILE 1, 23 (2017) (It.).
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Delaware’s dominance into question.185 In this respect, these decisions
could be seen as a “self-inflicted wound” to the supremacy that Delaware
has enjoyed for over a century.186
Others have questioned the regulation-by-litigation model and
advocated for a radical shift to a pure regulatory approach, such as the
Anglo-Irish code and panel-based model.187
Regardless of concerns and criticism, these doctrinal shifts have only
had a marginal impact on Delaware’s lead.188 Some subsequent
adjustments by the courts neutralized the risk of losing the significant
cases, and the sources of Delaware’s dominance prevailed.189
Because attorneys’ fees are typically higher in cases litigated before
Delaware courts, a plaintiff’s attorney with a plausible claim would rather
file his case in a Delaware court than elsewhere.190 Therefore, a possible
migration is most likely to concern frivolous suits, leaving Delaware with
meritorious cases.191 Since nuisance litigation does not involve precedentsetting decisions and does not help in gaining a dominant position in
adjudication, other jurisdictions have no interest in attracting it.192
In summary, Delaware’s courts and legislature have proven to be
highly responsive to corporate constituencies’ needs and most interested
185. Matera & Sbarbaro, supra note 169, at 77, 104; Matthew D. Cain et al., Mootness
Fees, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1777, 1782 (2019).
186. Bainbridge, supra note 51, at 851 (arguing that the Delaware General
Assembly’s ban on fee-shifting bylaws was a “self-inflicted wound”). With respect to the
fee-shifting bylaws story, the validity of such bylaws was first upheld by the Supreme
Court of Delaware in ATP Tour v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014)
(establishing the validity of fee-shifting bylaws under Delaware common law). But, due
to heavy criticism, Delaware General Corporation Law was amended to introduce a ban
on fee-shifting bylaws or articles. S.B. 75, 2015 Leg., 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Del. 2015).
187. See Dan Awrey et al., supra note 170, at 21-53, 64; Sean J. Griffith, Product
Differentiation in the Market for Corporate Law: A Regulatory Alternative to Delaware
Corporate Law, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED? EVALUATING DELAWARE’S
DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 16, 21, 24-28 (Stephen M. Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018).
188. See Matera & Sbarbaro, supra note 169, at 105-07.
189. Id. See also Ryan Lewis, What Happens in Delaware Need Not Stay in
Delaware: How Trulia Can Strengthen Private Enforcement of the Federal Securities
Laws, BYU L. REV. 715, 718-19, 738-40 (2017).
190. See Cain et al., supra note 185, at 1814.
191. See Matera & Sbarbaro, supra note 169, at 102.
192. Id. at 105-06 (“[S]ince meritless cases are in fact of little significance in the state
competition . . . other courts are likely to adopt the Trulia-Walgreen-Akorn approach to
avoid to a flood of nuisance litigation.”). See also Cain et al., supra note 185, at 1814.
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in maintaining the leading position in corporate law. Doctrinal shifts and
legislative amendments are usually prudent and carefully contemplated.
Thus, I contend that Delaware is likely to react to any migration of
important cases and address the cause. Conversely, it is unlikely to
endanger its leading role by precipitating a ruling and making hasty
decisions to retain meaningless cases.
C. FEDERAL EROSION
1. Gradual Erosion and Recent Debate
Some critics of Delaware’s dominance argue that federal legislation
should regulate large areas of corporate law, not only securities and
disclosure.193 These commentators claim that state legislatures are unfit to
curb the ambitions of capitalism, because managers and their lobbyists
are more likely to succeed in influencing the state legislative process than
the federal one.194
Indeed, a federal erosion of state corporate law has been gradually
progressing for decades.195 Periodically, when crises and corporate
scandals put pressure on the federal legislature, it multiplies its incursions
into corporate matters; examples of this include the New Deal (following
the Great Depression),196 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (following the

193. See Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters:
“Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259, 260, 266 (1980).
194. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting, supra note 51, at 874-75 (discussing feeshifting bylaws). See also Bainbridge, supra note 87, at 6-9.
195. See Matera & Sbarbaro, supra note 169, at 104.
196. For examples of New Deal era legislation touching on corporate matters, see
Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act of 1932, U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (repealed 1957);
Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162; Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §
77a-77mm; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, U.S.C. §§ 78a-78qq; Banking Act of 1935,
Pub. L. 74-305, 49 Stat. 684.
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Enron scandal),197 and the Dodd-Frank Act (following the subprime
mortgage crisis).198
As such, federal law can–and periodically does–displace state law,
which affects the state market for incorporations. In fact, any uniform
federal legislation reduces the room for differentiation of state
regulations, and thus reduces state law attractiveness and competitive
advantage.199 This has already occurred in some areas of corporate law,
such as disclosure, audit oversight, and executive compensation.200
Delaware lawmakers know that federal authorities could also displace
those decisions that remain in the state’s control if the state’s actions
seriously damaged the national economy or riled powerful national
interests.201
Put in other words, the state race in corporate law is limited not only
because Delaware has a dominant position which is virtually impossible
to override. It is also restricted in the sense that this vertical federal-state
competition is more significant than the horizontal state-to-state race.202
From this standpoint, Delaware’s strongest competitor in providing the
leading law for corporation is Washington D.C.203
For example, the Accountable Capitalism Act (ACA) was introduced
in Congress in 2018.204 Assuming that employees, customers, and the
197. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266. See Alton B. Harris & Andrea S.
Kramer, Corporate Governance: Pre-Enron, Post-Enron, in CORPORATE AFTERSHOCK:
THE PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR
CORPORATIONS 49, 49, 53 (Christopher L. Culp & William A. Niskanen eds., 2003);
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J., 1521, 1538, 1544-46 (2005); James S. Linck et al., The
Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and
Demand for Directors, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3287, 3294 (2009).
198. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§
5301-5641. See Cheffins, supra note 56, at 4.
199. See Elson, supra note 51.
200. See Roe, supra note 124, at 590, 644-45. See also Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra
note 124, at 1793, 1815-16 (indicating the main areas now regulated by federal law).
201. See Roe, supra note 124, at 590, 644-45.
202. Id. Therefore, the state race debate must take into account this heavy vertical
federal-state competition pattern; otherwise, the model would be largely misconceived.
Id.
203. See id. at 600.
204. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate,
Aug. 15, 2018). See also Workplace Democracy Act, H.R. 5728, 115th Cong. (2018);
Workplace Democracy Act, S. 2142, 114th Cong. (2015) (reintroduced 2018);
Employees’ Pension Security Act of 2009, H.R. 4281, 111th Cong. (2009); Employees’
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community at large do not substantially benefit from economic growth,
the ACA aimed to achieve a federal “reorientation” of corporate law and
corporate governance in particular. Those advocating for this approach
quoted two Business Roundtable statements as a clear indication that the
focus has dramatically shifted away from shareholders in American
corporate law.205

Security Pension Act of 2008, H.R. 5754, 110th Cong. (2008). The ACA was introduced
by Senator Elizabeth Warren, a leading candidate for the 2020 Democratic presidential
nomination. The goal of deeply reconsidering business and corporate law (in order to
rethink capitalism) was also pursued by the Reward Work Act, which accompanied the
ACA. Reward Work Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate, Mar. 22,
2018). The Reward Work Act was co-sponsored by Senators Warren, Sanders, and
others. The Reward Work Act was in line with the Workplace Democracy Act and
Employees’ Pension Security Acts re-introduced from 1992 to 2018 by Senator Sanders.
The ACA, along with the other aforementioned bills, would have established the right for
employees to elect 40 percent of directors on less than or equal to $1 billion company
boards and the right for employees to elect one-third of directors on other listed company
boards. It would have also required one-half employee representation on single-employer
pension plans. See Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in America at Work: The History of
Labor’s Vote in Corporate Governance, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 697, 697 (2019). The
Reward Work Act also provided for a ban of open-market stock buybacks, which might
be seen as overwhelmingly benefitting executives and activist hedge funds at the expense
of workers and retirement savers. Warren and Sanders’ proposed reforms advocated the
so-called codetermination system, which is inspired by Germany’s corporate governance.
This would have resulted in a critical shift from shareholder-centric governance to a more
stakeholder-friendly approach. See Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power
in American Corporations, 71 BUS. L. 381, 386-87 (2016). For criticism of this approach
in the context of the American corporate system, see Jens Dammann & Horst
Eidenmueller, Codetermination: A Poor Fit for U.S. Corporations, 3 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 870, 875-77. On ACA, see Carew S. Bartley, The Accountable Capitalism Act in
Context and Its Implications for Legal Ethics, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 373 (2020).
205. See Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote
‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’, BUS. ROUNTABLE, https://www.business
roundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promotean-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/U837-K7JP] (last visited Jan.
24, 2022). The two statements are actually quite dated: the first dated 1981 and the second
1997. Compare Letter from Senator Elizabeth Warren to Business Roundtable Immediate
Past Chairman of the Board of Directors Jamie Dimon and Chairman Doug McMillon,
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2020.09.17%20Letter%20to%20the%20
Business%20Roundtable%20re%20one-year%20anniversary%20of%20their%20
Statement%20of%20Principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CUW-ZY85] (last visited Dec.
25, 2021) with BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(1997),
http://www.ralphgomory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Business-Round
table-1997.pdf [https://perma.cc/W485-HMPD].
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What matters for the debate on Delaware’s dominance is that the
ACA calls to mind the original purpose of the public privileges deriving
from the incorporation. The ACA would have required large American
corporations206 to obtain both a federal and state corporate charter.207 The
federal incorporation could, among other things, have been revoked if the
corporation engaged in illegal activities. Additionally, the ACA contained
a “constituency statute,” imposing a duty of “creating a general public
benefit” on directors—meaning a benefit for all stakeholders, including
employees, the environment, and the long-term interests of the
enterprise.208
Large investors and eminent academics supported the ACA and
published a letter to endorse the bill. 209 Nevertheless, the debate soon
started to shift focus to the corporate purpose and shareholder value
doctrine—a reform not necessarily intertwined with a federal
incorporation.210 Subsequently, the Business Roundtable redefined its
206. This applies to corporations that have revenues over $1 billion. See Dammann,
supra note 66, at 5.
207. See Accountable Capitalism Act, WARREN.SENATE.GOV, https://www.warren.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Accountable%20Capitalism%20Act%20One-Pager.pdf
[https://perma.cc/93SC-JDAX] (last visited Dec. 25, 2021).
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Letter from Cornell University Law School to Senator Elizabeth
Warren,
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Federal%20Corporate%20
Charter%20Letter%20of%20Support.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT69-VLVK] (last visited
Dec. 25, 2021).
210. See David J. Berger, Reconsidering Stockholder Primacy in an Era of Corporate
Purpose, 74 BUS. L. 659, 662-64, 671-73 (2019); Jean-Philippe Robé, The Shareholder
Value Mess (And How to Clean it Up), 10 ACCT., ECON., & L.: A CONVIVIUM 1, 11-12,
25 (2019); Matteo Gatti & Chrystin D. Ondersma, Can a Broader Corporate Purpose
Redress Inequality? The Stakeholder Approach Chimera, 46 J. CORP. L. 1, 12-16 (2020);
Martin Lipton et al., On the Purpose of the Corporation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (May 27, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/27/on-thepurpose-of-the-corporation/[https://perma.cc/SGE8-S2NF]; Bernard S. Sharfman, A
Fuller Sense of Corporate Purpose: A Reply to Martin Lipton’s ‘on the Purpose of the
Corporation’, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (June 9, 2020), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/businesslaw-blog/blog/2020/06/fuller-sense-corporate-purpose-reply-martin-liptons-purpose
[https://perma.cc/C5MC-8KY8]; Martin Lipton et al., On the Purpose and Objective of
the Corporation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/05/on-the-purpose-and-objective-of-thecorporation/ [https://perma.cc/K4NV-2RNU]; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita,
The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 94-95, 17677 (2020). See generally Edward B. Rock, For Whom is the Corporation Managed in
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statement on the purpose of corporations as one that promotes an
economy that serves all Americans.211 And this, to some extent, diverted
the attention away from federal incorporation and reduced the risks for
Delaware’s dominance and the incorporation market as a whole.
Furthermore, I doubt the ACA ever constituted a significant threat to
Delaware’s dominance. By way of illustration, it is uncertain whether a
statute that requires large companies to obtain a federal charter as an
additional charter (not as a replacement of the state charter) can cause a
meaningful erosion of state corporate law.
2. The Federal Incorporation: A Losing Battle?
Crises are very often a vehicle for reform.212 However, the economic
crisis triggered by the current pandemic is unlikely to prompt the
introduction of a federal incorporation for at least three reasons.
First, the crisis is a direct consequence of the containment measures
against Covid-19, and not the result of financial abuses or corporate
scandals. As such, neither corporate law nor the state market for corporate
charters can be held accountable.
Second, as I mentioned above, a debate on capitalism and wealth
inequality is already underway. With regard to corporate governance, a
possible federal incorporation is no longer in the spotlight.
Third, as a matter of fact, the federal legislature has never succeeded
in enacting a law which requires companies to obtain a federal charter. So
far, the closest attempt to passing a federal incorporation law was the 1908
Hepburn Bill,213 which was introduced during the last term of Theodore
2020? The Debate over Corporate Purpose 1, 6, 21 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law
Working Paper No. 515, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589951 [https://perma.
cc/DU85-RLQB].
211. “Americans deserve an economy that allows each person to succeed through hard
work and creativity and to lead a life of meaning and dignity.” Statement on the Purpose
of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://opportunity.
businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/ [https://perma.cc/PPK9-RNR5]. According to
the statement, since businesses play a key role in the economy by creating jobs, providing
essential goods, and fostering innovation, subscribers (181 CEOs including Tim Cook,
Jeffrey P. Bezos, James Quincey, and many others) commit to lead their companies for
the benefit of all stakeholders, including shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers,
and the communities in which the businesses sit. Id.
212. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
213. Hepburn Bill, S. 6440, 60th Cong. (1908). This is not to be confused with the
Hepburn Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1906) about railroads rates. See Sung Hui Kim, The Failure
of Federal Incorporation Law. A public Choice Perspective, in CAN DELAWARE BE
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Roosevelt’s administration. The sequence of events that took place
around the Hepburn Bill is the perfect illustration of the pattern that this
debate usually follows. The context was the 1907 Panic, a bank panic
triggered by a failed attempt to corner the stock of United Copper.214 Once
the rescue was orchestrated, the cries for reform faded away. Many
opposed the bill, contending that the proposed reform was too radical, and
Roosevelt himself refused to compromise.215 When two decisions by the
Supreme Court216 managed to limit some corporate consolidations, the
concerns declined further, and the opposition became stronger.217 Finally,
President Taft abandoned the program.218 As some contended, the
alignment was just not right,219 and the federal legislature never came that
close to passing a federal incorporation statute again.
I argue that, while limited federal intervention into corporate matters
is possible–especially following a crisis correlated to corporate or
financial failings–a federal incorporation is unlikely to be enacted. At
least in the short-term, the federal incorporation debate will follow the
same patterns; it will gain strength in conjunction with a crisis or a major
election and fade afterwards.
More likely, the federal erosion of state corporate law will gradually
continue.

DETHRONED? EVALUATING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 78, 80, 92-98
(Stephen M. Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018). See also Urofsky, supra note 102, 160-62, 18182; MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM,
1890-1916 280-81, 373-76 (1988).
214. The third largest trust company of New York went bankrupt because it could not
meet a run on its deposit. Consequently, the panic spread, until J.P. Morgan orchestrated
an intervention to rescue the banking system. Kim, supra note 213, 88.
215. Id. at 92-96, 100.
216. For the United States Supreme Court’s long-awaited implementation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, see Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 31 S. Ct.
502, 505 (1911) and United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 31 S. Ct. 632, 651 (1911).
217. See Kim, supra note 213, 98. See also TALBOT, supra note 15, 17-18.
218. See Kim, supra note 213, 98; Urofsky, supra note 102, 182; SKLAR, supra note
213, 283, 375-76.
219. See Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 124, at 602, 608-10; Kim, supra
note 213, 98-100.
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3. Offshore Jurisdictions, Competition for Incorporations, and Federal
Intervention
According to some commentators, there exists an additional reason
for the federal legislature to intervene in the jurisdictional competition to
attract incorporators.220 I further contend that this reason might also
constitute a significant challenge for Delaware’s dominance.221
The premise is that U.S. courts routinely extend the internal affairs
doctrine to firms incorporated abroad.222 Consequently, the standard
account of the state-based competition for the incorporations might, in
reality, be incomplete, and Delaware might face increasing competition
on a globalized market for corporate law. While most foreign nations do
not pose a competitive threat in this regard, a handful of foreign
jurisdictions—in particular, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and the
Cayman Islands—have been offering permissive rules to attract publicly
traded corporations that mainly operate outside of those jurisdictions.223

220. See William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. U.L. REV. 1403,
1406, 1418-20, 1422 (2020) [hereinafter Moon, Delaware’s New Competition]; Moon,
supra note 66, at 1698-1709. See also Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the
Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1748-51 (2015). On the
impact of globalization on Delaware’s role, see Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s
Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 219, 234-35 (2015).
221. See also Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 220; Talley, supra
note 220.
222. For the application of foreign corporate laws under the internal affairs doctrine
by United States courts, see Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 220, at 1420
nn.79-84, 86. See, e.g., Vaughn v. LJ Int’l, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 169, 174 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009) (applying British Virgin Islands law regarding a firm incorporated in the British
Virgin Islands with no other connection to that jurisdiction); NatTel v. SAC Capital
Advisors, 370 Fed. App’x 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying Bahamas law regarding an
entity established in the Bahamas); Kostolany v. Davis, No. 13299, 1995 WL 662683, at
*3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1995) (applying Dutch law in a Delaware court regarding a firm
incorporated in the Netherlands); Pittway Corp. v. United States, 88 F.3d 501, 503 (7th
Cir. 1996) (applying French law regarding an entity incorporated in France and
describing France as a “State in the international sense” under the internal affairs
doctrine); Tomran v. Passano, 891 A.2d 336, 342 (Md. 2006) (applying Irish law
regarding a firm incorporated in Ireland); Varga v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 952 F. Supp.
2d 850, 855 (D. Minn. 2013) (applying Cayman Islands law to The Palm Beach Funds
because it was incorporated in the Cayman Islands), aff’d, 764 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2014);
Krys v. Aaron, 106 F. Supp. 3d 472, 484-86 (D.N.J. 2015) (applying Cayman Island law).
223. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 220, at 1406.
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Unsurprisingly, then, these islands have been labeled as “offshore
corporate law havens.”224
These small jurisdictions feature a peculiar combination of factors.
Their physical proximity to the United States certainly is a relevant
circumstance; so are the favorable tax regimes.225 But there is more at
play. With the aid of some private-sector lawyers, these lawmakers have
enacted director-friendly legislation specifically designed for “exempted”
or “excepted” companies—i.e., foreign firms that do not (and in many
cases legally cannot) conduct any business on their soil.226 These laws
might allow American corporations to opt out of some mandatory rules
of American corporate law.227
In addition, these jurisdictions have established specialized business
courts, where disputes are resolved in a manner similar to that of
commercial arbitration: in secret, without juries, or published, wellreasoned, and fact-specific opinions.228
Further, the commitment by these jurisdictions to keep providing lax
corporate law is supported by at least three circumstances: (1) these
nations usually “do not confront the type of democratic accountability
facing larger nations, or even large states like New York or California, in
part because they specialize in producing laws for corporations that do
not physically operate within their territories;”229 (2) their governments
have a strong interest in attracting and retaining foreign corporations since
they heavily rely on incorporation fees; and (3) the legislative process is
easily captured by interest groups endorsing this approach.230
These offshore corporate law havens are already global market
leaders for closely held business entities such as mutual funds, hedge
funds, and trusts.231 But they might be pursuing a broader strategy, thereby
creating a state-to-nation state competition for public companies.232 As of
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 1408.
Id. at 1407-23.
Id. at 1403, 1408 n.22. See also William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance,
72 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12-15 (2019).
227. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 220, at 1410, 1423, 1444.
228. Id. at 1408-09, 1437-38. “Judges serving in these courts, like arbitrators, are
credentialed business law jurists, including partners at major international law firms who
fly in from overseas to preside over cases ad hoc.” Id. 1409.
229. Id. at 1408.
230. Id. at 1429-37.
231. Moon, supra note 226, at 3-4.
232. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, supra note 220, at 1409.
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2020, “over 14 [percent] of large publicly traded corporations listed in
American securities markets” were already incorporated in a foreign
jurisdiction.233 Some commentators also demonstrated that some foreign
firms operating within vastly different market environments may be less
inclined or even averse to Delaware’s corporate governance model.234
Certainly, the issue calls for further investigation. 235 Regarding
jurisdictional competition, however, I believe there are some
countervailing considerations that might come into play in incorporating
an American business outside of the United States: reputational
implications or a potential reduction in the attractiveness for investors
might come into account when considering whether re-incorporating in
these offshore jurisdictions.236 In addition, some of the limits illustrated
about Nevada’s strategy are relevant for this case too: the strategy that
these corporate law havens adopt has, for example, the typical limits of
Nevada’s market segmentation in terms of capability to capture only a
particular type of corporations—mainly foreign firms listed on U.S.
markets.237
Finally, I agree that the federal legislature might intervene to halt
large American corporations from opting out of the mandatory rules of
American corporate governance by incorporating in these offshore
jurisdictions. Yet, this intervention might not necessarily imply a further
erosion of state corporate law. For example, it might mandate some
specific disclosure; or, it might simply exclude the application of the
internal affairs doctrine for those firms incorporated in offshore
jurisdictions but with no connection with them. This approach would
remove any incentive for American businesses to incorporate in a
corporate law haven, as the sole purpose of this sort of foreign
incorporation is to elude the mandatory provisions of American corporate
governance.
In other words, even if the federal legislature interceded, this
intervention would probably not affect the state-based market for
corporate charters.

Id. at 1407, 1424.
Moon, supra note 66, at 1720, 1734-36.
See, e.g., Moon, supra note 66, at 1708-16.
But cf. id. at 1730-34. There, Moon discusses the role of market infrastructures
on the choice of incorporation.
237. Id. at 1685, 1700-07, 1720-28 (showing the types of companies considered).
233.
234.
235.
236.
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IV. A NEW CHALLENGE: WYOMING AND BLOCKCHAIN COMPANIES
A. BLOCKCHAIN INNOVATION AND LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
While Nevada’s success was limited, and neither the migration of
cases nor federal incorporation currently constitute a serious threat, a new
challenge to Delaware’s dominance could originate from technological
innovation, in particular blockchain. This technology has become
increasingly popular in recent years. The interest was first due to a
particular application of blockchain, i.e., cryptocurrencies such as
Bitcoin, though later the importance of this technological innovation
expanded beyond virtual currencies.238 Blockchain is now considered the
most transformative technology since the creation of the World Wide
Web, with the potential to revolutionize our society and economic
system.239
Interestingly, blockchain technology can offer important business
opportunities and significantly affect corporate governance and financial
intermediation. In this respect, blockchain is not only an opportunity for
corporations240 but also for states that aim to attract incorporators and
challenge Delaware’s position. The question is whether it can be a gamechanger in the market for corporate charters.
The answer is far from simple and, before making some progress
towards it, I will briefly outline the potential of this technology in
corporate governance and how jurisdictions are approaching this
innovation.
A blockchain is essentially a distributed database, having the form
of a digital public ledger that is resistant to modification and contains a
certain and verifiable record of every single transaction made.241
238. See MICHÈLE FINCK, BLOCKCHAIN REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE
34 (2019); Florian Möslein, Blockchain Applications and Company Law, in LEGAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFORMATION. A PRACTICAL ASSESSMENT 1, 237 (Andrea Caligiuri
ed., 2020).
239. See FINCK, supra note 238; Möslein, supra note 238.
240. In a sense, blockchain is a business opportunity but also an opportunity for
businesses.
241. See Michael Crosby et al., Blockchain Technology: Beyond Bitcoin, 2 APPLIED
INNOVATION REV. 6, 6-8 (2016).

A blockchain is essentially a distributed database of records, or public
ledger of all transactions or digital events that have been executed and
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Therefore, this technology can provide the business community with
certainty and disintermediation; it could innovate corporate governance
by delivering certain, readily available information and eliminating the
costs and failures of intermediation.242 Its applications range from
participation in general meetings to remote voting (without a proxy) to
shareholder identifications to the direct holding systems of securities to
the maintenance of corporate records to their transmission.243
shared among participating parties. Each transaction in the public
ledger is verified by consensus of a majority of the participants in the
system. Once entered, information can never be erased.
Id. Blockchains can be permissionless, i.e., open for anyone to view and participate, or
permissioned, which are the blockchains limiting the participation to a single
administrator or a specific group of participants. Id.
242. See David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 REV. FIN. 7, 910, 18, 23 (2017); Pierluigi Matera, Note in Tema di Blockchain e Assemblee delle
Società Quotate nell’Età della Disintermediazione, COMPARAZIONE E DIRITTO CIVILE 1,
3-4 (2018) (It.); Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679, 683
(2019); Federico Panisi et al., Blockchain and Public Companies: A Revolution in Share
Ownership Transparency, Proxy Voting and Corporate Governance?, 2 STAN. J.
BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y. 189, 206 (2019); Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for
Agency Problems in Corporate Governance, in INFORMATION FOR EFFICIENT DECISION
MAKING 313, 326-27 (Kashi R. Balachandran ed., 2020); Philipp Hacker, Corporate
Governance for Complex Cryptocurrencies? A Framework for Stability and Decision
Making in Blockchain-Based Organizations, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNOSOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 140, 161-62 (Philipp Hacker et al. eds., 2019); Vedat
Akgiray, The Potential for Blockchain Technology in Corporate Governance 1, 6
(OECD, Working Paper No. 21, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1787/ef4eba4c-en [https://
perma.cc/M9K3-GW84]; Alexandra Sims, Blockchain and Decentralised Autonomous
Organisations (DAOs): The Evolution of Companies?, 28 N.Z. UNIV. L. REV. 423, 423
(2019); Dulani Jayasuriya Daluwathmullagamge & Alexandra Sims, BlockchainEnabled Corporate Governance and Regulation, 8 INT’L J. FIN. STUD. 36, 36 (2020);
Alexandra Andhov, Corporations on Blockchain: Opportunities & Challenges, 53
CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 1, 3 (2020); Mark Fenwick & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The End of the
Corporation: Transformation in Corporate Governance, in CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TRANSFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL ERA 1,
12 (Mikhail Y. Kuznetsov & Maria I. Nikishova eds., 2020), at 12.
243. See David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 REV. FIN. 7, 910, 18, 23 (2017); Matera, supra note 242, at 2-4; Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and the
Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679, 683 (2019); Federico Panisi et al., Blockchain and
Public Companies: A Revolution in Share Ownership Transparency, Proxy Voting and
Corporate Governance?, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y. 189, 206 (2019); Wulf A.
Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance, in
INFORMATION FOR EFFICIENT DECISION MAKING 313, 326-27 (Kashi R. Balachandran ed.,
2020); Philipp Hacker, Corporate Governance for Complex Cryptocurrencies? A
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What blockchain means in terms of digital assets (i.e.,
cryptocurrencies and tokens) is renowned. With an “explosive growth and
wild price swings,” the cryptoasset market has already reached a value of
$1.6 trillion.244
In the face of this potential, neither Congress nor any federal agency
has yet passed specific regulation. In theory, although they lack explicit
authority, several federal regulatory bodies might have jurisdiction over
digital assets, including the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).245 In
Framework for Stability and Decision Making in Blockchain-Based Organizations, in
REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 140, 161-62
(Philipp Hacker et al. eds., 2019); Vedat Akgiray, The Potential for Blockchain
Technology in Corporate Governance 1, 6 (OECD, Working PaperS No. 21, 2019)
https://doi.org/10.1787/ef4eba4c-en [https://perma.cc/ER9X-NT4L]; Alexandra Sims,
Blockchain and Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs): The Evolution of
Companies?, 28 N.Z. UNIV. L. REV. 423, 423 (2019); Dulani Jayasuriya
Daluwathmullagamge & Alexandra Sims, Blockchain-Enabled Corporate Governance
and Regulation, 8 INT’L J. FIN. STUD. 36, 36 (2020); Alexandra Andhov, Corporations
on Blockchain: Opportunities & Challenges 3 (U. Copenhagen Fac. of L., Legal Studies
Research Paper Series No. 2019-85, 2019) (forthcoming in CORNELL INT’L. L.J.); Mark
Fenwick & Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The End of the Corporation: Transformation in
Corporate Governance, in CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE TRANSFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL ERA 1 (Mikhail Y. Kuznetsov & Maria
I. Nikishova eds., 2020), at 12. But see Luca Enriques & Dirk A. Zetzsche, Corporate
Technologies and the Tech Nirvana Fallacy, 72 HASTINGS L.J. 55 (2020), at 62.
According to Enriques and Zetzsche, corporate technologies, also referred to as
“CorpTech”, including blockchain, can affect corporate governance to a certain extent:
“So long as humans yield influence over the firm, the question of who decides what code
is deployed and what data is processed will be key, and traditional corporate governance
mechanisms will retain their core function of curbing agency problems within the firm.”
Id. at 62. Moreover, in the short term, the transition to a CorpTech-dominated governance
environment might even aggravate agency problems within firms. This would be due to
an insufficient understanding or an over-confidence in these technologies deriving from
a “tech nirvana fallacy”, i.e. the tendency of comparing supposedly perfect machines with
failure-prone humans. Id. at 61, 71-96.
244. See Robert Schmidt & Benjamin Bain, New SEC Boss Wants More Crypto
Oversight to Protect Investors, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 3, 2021, 12:01 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-03/will-government-regulate-crypto-secchair-gary-gensler-on-bitcoin-and-oversight [https://perma.cc/4KAZ-HGKG].
245. See The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introductioninvesting/investing-basics/role-sec [https://perma.cc/85NX-GJVC] (last visited Oct. 13,
2021); About the CFTC-The Commission, CTFC, https://www.cftc.gov/About/
AboutTheCommission [https://perma.cc/SS4E-CQWF] (last visited Oct. 13, 2021). See
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practice, both agencies operate on a case-by-case basis. In particular, the
SEC is adopting a regulation-by-enforcement approach246 in an attempt to
claim a role in the policing of cryptoassets. Nevertheless, this agency is
struggling to adapt existing authorities to such an innovative product. For
instance, to qualify a transaction as an “investment contract” for the
purposes of federal securities laws, the SEC employs the standard
formulated in the 1946 case SEC v. Howey247 (the “Howey test”).248
Unsurprisingly, the application of such a dated test to determine whether
an initial coin offering (ICO) is equivalent to an initial public offering
(IPO) (and, as such, subject to registration under the Securities Act of
1933 and possibly under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) has turned
out to be rather challenging.249
also Michele B. Neitz, How to Regulate Blockchain’s Real-Life Applications: Lessons
from the California Blockchain Working Group, 61 JURIMETRICS J. 185, 202 (2021);
Yulya Guseva, A conceptual framework for digital-assets securities: Tokens and Coins
as Debt and Equity, 80 MD. L. REV. 166, 174 (2020).
246. See Douglas S. Eakeley et al., Crypto-Enforcement Around the World, 94 S. CAL.
L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 99, 100 (2021).
247. 328 U.S. 293, 293, 297, 300 (1946).
248. After some initial uncertainties, the SEC began to pursue this policy and, in 2017,
explicitly stated that the Howey test applied to digital assets. SEC, 25-7-2017, “Report
of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The
DAO”. In the following years, this approach has been consolidated through a line of
cases. See In the Matter of TokenLot, LLC, Lenny Kugel, and Eli. L. Lewitt, Securities
Act Release No. 10543 (Sept. 11, 2018); In the Matter of Zachart Coburn, Securities Act
Release No. 84553 (Nov. 8, 2018). See also Press Release No. 227, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, SEC Proposes Rules to Extend Regulations ATS and SCI to Treasuries and
Other Government Securities Markets; In the Matter of Carrierq, Inc., D/B/A AirFox,
Securities Act Release No. 10575 (Nov. 16, 2018); SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., 492
F.Supp.3d 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); SEC v. Telegram Grp. No. 19 CIV. 9439 (PKC), 2020
WL 61528, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2020). See generally Muhammed Kus, A Critical
Review of U.S. Securities Laws and the Status of Initial Coin Offerings: Potential
Solutions for Issuers (2018) (LLM dissertation, Indiana University).
249. See STRATEGIC HUB FOR INNOVATION & FIN. TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR
“INVESTMENT CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ASSETS 1-2 (2019),
https://www.sec.gov/files/dlt-framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YPR-XL6F]. See also
Cease-and-Desist Order, Securities Act Release No. 10445 (Dec. 11, 2017); William
Hinman, Director, Div. Corp. Fin., Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit:
Crypto: Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic) (June 14, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418
[https://perma.cc/T8HGGWPY]; James J. Park, & Howard H. Park, Regulation by Selective Enforcement: The
SEC and Initial Coin Offerings, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 100 (2020). In recent
cases, contradictions are emerging—and this might be a turning point for this policy. See
generally Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ripple Labs, (No. 20-CV-10832); Press
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The regulatory responses by state legislatures have been varied. New
York State focused on virtual currency businesses and in 2015 issued a
controversial regulation250 known under the name of “BitLicense,”251
which requires all virtual currency operators to obtain a license from the
state.252 Predictably, this regulation resulted in an exodus of blockchain
and virtual currency businesses from New York.253
Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Ripple and Two Executives with
Conducting $1.3 Billion Unregistered Securities Offering (Dec. 22, 2020), https://
www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-338 [https://perma.cc/SX39-EPSV]; Roslyn
Layton, Toward a Ripple Test at the SEC, FORBES (July 22, 2021, 6:35 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/roslynlayton/2021/07/22/toward-a-ripple-test-at-thesec/?sh=1ea1611b2e67 [https://perma.cc/DZ3F-KEZ4]; David H. Freedman, Why
Ripple’s SEC Lawsuit Could Have a Lasting Impact on Crypto, FORTUNE (July 29, 2021,
5:20 AM), https://fortune.com/2021/07/29/ripple-xrp-sec-lawsuit-impact-on-cryptoindustry/ [https://perma.cc/6HTC-Y2UY]. Cryptoassets might also be qualified as
commodities, and as such, subject to the relevant federal regulation and the authority of
the CFTC. See Commodity Future Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F.Supp.3d 213,
226 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Commodity Future Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, 334
F.Supp.3d 492, 496–97 (D. Mass. 2018); Press Release, Commodity Future Trading
Comm’n, Agency Ordered Over $1.3 Billion in Monetary Relief and Brought Record
Number of Actions in FY 2020 (Dec. 01, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/PressReleases/8323-20 [https://perma.cc/TJQ7-2L2P].
250. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.3 (2015).
251. Neitz, supra note 245, at 215.
252. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.3 (2015).
(a) License required. No Person shall, without a license obtained from
the superintendent as provided in this Part, engage in any Virtual
Currency Business Activity. Licensees are not authorized to exercise
fiduciary powers, as defined under Section 100 of the Banking Law.
(b) Unlicensed agents prohibited. Each Licensee is prohibited from
conducting any Virtual Currency Business Activity through an agent
or agency arrangement when the agent is not a Licensee.
Id. According to this approach, virtual currency operators must be treated equally as
traditional money transmitters. Nevertheless, traditional, long-established operators are
usually better equipped to deal with an extensive regulatory framework. A proposal to
amend this regulation is pending.
253. Commentators labeled New York’s policy on the matter as a “boomerang
approach.” See Neitz, supra note 245, at 188, 215-16. In June 2020, in response to
criticism, the New York State Department of Financial Services announced a
“conditional license” framework according to which companies may participate in the
issue of currencies even before a BitLicense is released, for example, if the applicant
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In other jurisdictions, the framework is still uncertain.254 Delaware is
hedging its bets. Yet, other states are enacting more liberal regulations in
the attempt to entice entrepreneurs to register or move there. The
comparison among these approaches is essential to understand how they
can affect the corporate charters market.
In 2017, Delaware passed an innovative piece of legislation255 that
amended the DGCL and allowed its corporations to keep corporate
records on electronic networks or databases, including blockchain.256

partners up and collaborates with already-licensed entities. Notice of Virtual Currency
Business Activity License Application Procedures, N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERV. (Oct. 13, 2021,
5:45 PM), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/apps_and_licensing/virtual_currency_businesses/gn/
notice_vc_busact_lic_app_procedure [https://perma.cc/8XGF-QX3R]. Since 2020, New
Jersey has been working on a “Digital Asset and Blockchain Technology Act.” See S.
3132, 219th Leg. (N.J. 2020); H.R. 3132, 219th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020). If
passed, this bill would impose a license on anyone engaging or holding out to engage in
a digital asset business activity—similarly to the BitLicense, which the neighboring New
York State mandates. The bill has been introduced in both houses, which suggests that it
is likely to become law.
254. For instance, in California, the Money Transmission Act does not address virtual
currencies, and the state has not issued official guidance on the applicability of that statute
to cryptocurrencies. This has been defined as a “tortoise approach.” Neitz, supra note
245, at 212-15. California Blockchain Working Group, a legislature-created committee,
published its final report in July 2020. See Crittenden et al., BLOCKCHAIN IN CALIFORNIA:
A ROADMAP, CALIFORNIA BLOCKCHAIN WORKING GROUP 14 (2020),
https://www.govops.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2020/07/BWG-Final-Report2020-July1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ACD-7EJL]. Similarly, Florida has not amended its
Money Transmitter Act. This statute does not expressly include the concepts of “virtual
currencies” or “monetary value,” and the State’s Office of Financial Regulation has not
provided direct guidance as to the applicability of this law to virtual currency users and
issuers. However, it is reasonable to believe that, under Florida law, persons who offer
cryptocurrency wallets, or buy, sell, or exchange cryptocurrencies, are not to be
considered necessarily outside the scope of the activities subject to the Act. See Carlton
Fields, State Regulations on Virtual Currency and Blockchain Technology,
https://www.carltonfields.com/insights/publications/2018/state-regulations-on-virtualcurrency-and-blockchain-technologies [https://perma.cc/8DQG-VEB6] (last updated
Aug. 29, 2019). See also, Florida v. Espinoza, 264 So. 3d 1055, 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2019) (reversing the trial court decision and interpreting the state’s money laundering
legislation extensively, holding that selling bitcoin directly to another person is covered
under the law). Ironically, in June 2017 state legislature had passed an amendment to the
Money Laundering Act in response to the trial court’s decision in this case, expressly
prohibiting the laundering of virtual currency. See H.R. 1379, 2017 Leg. (Fla. 2017).
255. S. 69, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2017) (the so-called “Blockchain Bill”).
256. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 224 (West 2017).
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Additionally, these kept records can be used to prepare the list of
stockholders,257 record information,258 and record transfer of stock,259
thereby enabling corporations to trade corporate stock using a
blockchain.260 Nevertheless, Delaware law also provides that the records
must be convertible “into clearly legible paper form upon the request of any
person entitled to inspect such records.”261

Any records administered by or on behalf of the corporation in the
regular course of its business, including its stock ledger, books of
account, and minute books, may be kept on, or by means of, or be in
the form of, any information storage device, method, or one or more
electronic networks or databases (including one or more distributed
electronic networks or databases).
Id.; Joanna D. Caytas, Blockchain in the U.S. Regulatory Setting: Evidentiary Use in
Vermont, Delaware, and Elsewhere, COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2017). See
generally Wonnie Song, Bullish on Blockchain: Examining Delaware’s Approach to
Distributed Ledger Technology in Corporate Governance Law and Beyond, 8 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 9 (2018); Andrea Tinianow & Caitlin Long, Delaware Blockchain
Initiative: Transforming the Foundational Infrastructure of Corporate Finance, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 16, 2017), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2017/03/16/delaware-blockchain-initiative-transforming-thefoundational-infrastructure-of-corporate-finance/ [https://perma.cc/6HTY-VWS7]; J.
Travis Laster & Marcel T. Rosner, Distributed Stock Ledgers and Delaware Law, 73
BUS. L. 319, 336 (2018).
257. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 219-220 (West 2017).
258. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 156, 159, 217(a), 218 (West 2017).
259. See generally DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 8-101-8-602 (West 1998).
260. The definition of “electronic transmission” was amended to include blockchain
technology. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 232 (West 2017); S. 69, 149th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Del. 2017). The certificate of incorporation and bylaws can now be
transmitted via blockchain, in addition to the traditional means. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
116(a)(3) (West 2017). The state legislature also updated the Delaware Limited Liability
Company Act to enable domestic limited liability companies to use networks of
electronic databases, such as blockchain, for the creation and maintenance of limited
liability company records and for certain electronic transmissions. S. 183, 149th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1, at 58-59 (Del. 2018). Similarly, the Delaware Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act was amended in order to provide specific statutory authority for
Delaware limited partnerships to do the same. S. 182, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Del. 2018).
261. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 224 (West 2017).
When records are kept in such manner, a clearly legible paper form
prepared from or by means of the information storage device, method,
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Vermont adopted a more liberal approach. This jurisdiction also passed
a bill that makes a fact or record verified through blockchain technology
“authentic” for use in court proceedings262 with no immediate need for
conversion into paper.263 Moreover, it enabled blockchain records to be
governed under the authentication, admissibility, and presumptions
requirements of the Vermont Rules of Evidence.264 With specific
reference to cryptocurrencies, it is worth noting that Vermont applies its
money transmission laws to virtual currency, but also allows companies
to hold virtual currency as a permissible investment.265
Yet, the most interesting innovation the Vermont state legislature
enacted is the creation of “blockchain-based limited liability companies”
(BBLLCs).266 Passed in 2018, this statute allows entities to incorporate or
re-incorporate their businesses under this form, which the statute defines
as a company organized “for the purpose of operating a business that
utilizes blockchain technology for a material portion of its business
activities.”267 Once established, incorporators must also “specify whether
the decentralized consensus ledger or database utilized or enabled by the
BBLLC will be fully decentralized or partially decentralized and whether
such ledger or database will be fully or partially public or private.”268

or one or more electronic networks or databases (including one or
more distributed electronic networks or databases) shall be valid and
admissible in evidence, and accepted for all other purposes, to the
same extent as an original paper record of the same information would
have been, provided the paper form accurately portrays the record.
262.
263.

H.R. 868, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2016).
VERMONT STATE ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, BLOCKCHAINS FOR
PUBLIC RECORDKEEPING AND FOR RECORDING LAND RECORDS, 26 (2019),
https://legislature.vermont.gov/assets/Legislative-Reports/2019-BlockchainLegislative-Report-VSARA.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7XB-HHC3].
264. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1913 (West 2018).
265. H.R. 182, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2017). Digital currency businesses
with money transmitter licenses are required to hold a certain amount of permissible
investments, and this law explicitly holds that virtual currency is a permissible investment
in this respect. Id. § 16(a)(5).
266. Id.
267. S. 269, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018).
268. Id. For a discussion regarding a proposed crypto-corporation form, see Timothy
Nielsen, Cryptocorporations: A Proposal for Legitimizing Decentralized Autonomous
Organizations, 5 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1129 (2019). “By borrowing from and building
upon the attributes of partnerships, LLCs, and corporations, the concept of the
Cryptocorporation has the potential to foster the productive use and development of smart
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From the governance to the maintenance of corporate records, this type
of company adopts blockchain as a primary tool, not only as an alternative
permitted under some conditions. Arguably, Vermont is using BBLLC as
a laboratory where to experiment the potential of blockchain technology.
B. WYOMING’S STRATEGY
1. Wyoming’s Blockchain Legislation
Wyoming is the state that has pushed the challenge even further and has
emerged as the most blockchain-friendly jurisdiction so far.269 It has focused
on the business opportunities deriving from digital assets more than the
potential of blockchain for corporate governance.270 In fact, Wyoming has
passed more than a dozen liberal bills to attract blockchain, cryptocurrency,
and token-based businesses.271
Wyoming’s tech bet did not come as a complete surprise. This
jurisdiction has a history of using innovation in corporate law as a strategy
to attract incorporators: it is a known fact that Wyoming was the first U.S.
jurisdiction to introduce the limited liability company form in March
1977.272
Interestingly, what Wyoming has done about attracting blockchain
businesses thus far relates as much to corporate law as to securities law. In
particular, what this jurisdiction is doing with regard to blockchain and
securities laws is unique to Wyoming’s policy on blockchain business and
calls for further clarification. As is well known, although federal law
regulates most aspects relating to securities, some regulation is left to state
laws to dictate. These laws—commonly referred to as “Blue Sky Laws”—

contract technology for decentralized organizations, while mitigating the risks to
investors and facilitating a more frictionless secondary market.” Id.
269. See Neitz, supra note 245, at 214-15 (criticizing Wyoming for using a “hare
approach”).
270. Id.
271. Gregory Barber, The Newest Haven for Cryptocurrency Companies? Wyoming,
WIRED (June 13, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/newest-havencryptocurrency-companies-wyoming/ [https://perma.cc/2LBR-SM2M].
272. See Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws
577 (enacted); Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing
the Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 400 (1996); Susan Pace
Hamill, The Story of LLCs: Combining the Best Features of a Flawed Business Tax
Structure, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 296 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005).
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impose disclosure and filing requirements to protect the public from
fraud.273 Wyoming is essentially exempting digital assets from these laws.
Certainly, providing exemptions to Blue Sky Laws for an entire business
sector might defeat the raison d’être of such laws; but it must also be
interpreted as a clear indication of Wyoming’s determination to become
the most desirable jurisdiction for blockchain companies.
The story of the Utility Token Bill274—signed into law by Wyoming
state legislature in 2018—exemplifies this strategy. First, pursuant to this
statute, “utility tokens” were exempted from state securities laws–in the
sense that a developer or seller of an open blockchain token was not
considered as the issuer of a security.275 In particular, the securities
exemption was granted to utility tokens under three conditions: that (1)
the developer or seller of the token276 had filed a notice of intent with the
secretary of state; (2) the purpose of the token was consumptive–the token
had only be exchangeable or provided for the receipt of goods, services,
or content;277 and (3) the developer or seller of the token had not sold the
273. They were originally conceived to regulate the offering and sale of securities and
protect the public from fraud by imposing disclosure and filing requirements (the
registration of stockbrokers, brokerage firms, and any offering and sale of securities).
Traditionally, Kansas is thought to be the first jurisdiction to enact Blue Sky Laws in
1911. See Act of March 10, 1911, ch. 133, 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210; Rick A.
Fleming, 100 Years of Securities Law: Examining a Foundation Laid in the Kansas Blue
Sky, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 583 (2011). Some commentators claim that a previous
example of state securities laws can be found in a 1909 Nevada law imposing disclosure
and filing requirements on mining companies. See, e.g., Keith P. Bishop, No Blue Sky for
Almost a Half Century, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/no-blue-sky-almost-half-century [https://perma.cc/R888-3S3Q]. See also 1909
Nev. Stat. 100-01 (repealed 1915). Since the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Securities Act—a model statute for state
securities law—in 1956, most Blue Sky laws are patterned after this model. State
securities laws and federal securities laws complemented for years, with some overlap
and duplication. In the last 25 years, federal regulation on securities and the SEC has
largely preempted Blue Sky laws. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C. 2006)); Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified); Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue‐Sky
Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229, 234 (2003); Amy
Westbrook, Blue Skies for 100 Years: Introduction to the Special Issue on Corporate and
Blue Sky Law, 50 WASHBURN L.J. xxv, xxxii (2011).
274. H.R. 70, 64th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018).
275. Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679, 683 (2019).
276. Or the registered agent of the developer or seller.
277. Including rights of access to goods, services, or content.
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token to the initial buyer as a financial investment.278 By virtue of this
statute, “a person who facilitates the exchange of an open blockchain
token [was] not be deemed a broker-dealer or a person who otherwise
deals in securities”—with few exceptions made.279
Subsequently, Wyoming went even further: in 2019 the state
legislature repealed these provisions280 and established that open
blockchain tokens with specified consumptive characteristics are
intangible personal property.281 As such, these utility tokens are not
qualifiable as securities and, therefore, they avoid needing a securities
exemption altogether.
This liberal approach is not shared by the SEC, which is currently
more inclined to conclude that tokens are securities in most cases.282 This
agency is advocating for the enactment of a federal legislation and aiming
to pass its own regulation—if conferred specific authority on the
matter.283 Should Congress or the SEC intervene, Wyoming would fail to
provide issuers of “utility tokens” with a completely safe harbor. More
generally, a federal regulation would narrow how much state legislatures
could differentiate their policies, thereby limiting Wyoming’s strategy to
attract tech companies through a favorable legislation.
This federal intervention may not be just a remote possibility. The
failed attempts by Congress to legislate suggest that the federal legislature
is in fact considering filling the gap and regulating the matter. For
example, in March 2020, a federal bill named the Crypto-Currency Act
278.
279.
280.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-206(a) (2018) (repealed 2019).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-206(b) (2018) (repealed 2019).
Wyoming Utility Token Act - Property Amendments, H.R. 0062, 65th Leg. § 4

(2019).
281. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34‑29‑101(b) (2019).
282. Jay Clayton, Former Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on
Cryptocurrencies, and Initial Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11 [https://perma.cc/L5GT-5A6V].
As anticipated, this statement regards ICOs. The cryptoasset policy of the SEC is built
on enforcement of pre-crypto regulations. Critics emphasise that the SEC has used
existing authorities to evaluate new product approval, while digital assets would call for
policy solutions more tailored to the different nature of these products. See Yuliya
Guseva, When the Means Undermine the End: The Leviathan of Securities Law and
Enforcement in Digital-Asset Markets, STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y (forthcoming
2022). See also Dan Awrey, The Crypto Puzzle, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (June 22, 2018),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/06/crypto-puzzle
[https://perma.cc/S5YW-JMF9].
283. See Schmidt & Bain, supra note 244.
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of 2020 was introduced into Congress.284 It contained a comprehensive
reform of U.S. cryptocurrency regulation.285 The bill failed to be
enacted—it was probably doomed from the start.286 Yet, it offers an
“insight into what a top-to-bottom new law governing crypto could look
like one day” 287 and suggests that the federal legislature might
intervene.288
A further indication of possibly imminent federal regulation comes
from the digital asset provision in a bill Congress passed in November
2021, the “Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act”289 (commonly referred
to as the “Infrastructure Bill”). Three pages of this 1039-page piece of
legislation are dedicated to cryptoassets and mandate tax information
reporting for some cryptocurrency transactions.290 Unsurprisingly, the
284.
285.

H.R. 6154, 116th Cong. (2020).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 232 (West 2017); S. 69, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Del. 2017).
286. Daniel Kuhn, The Cryptocurrency Act of 2020 is ‘Dead on Arrival,’ Washington
Tells Sponsors, COINDESK (Mar. 10, 2020, 2:32 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/thecryptocurrency-act-of-2020-is-dead-on-arrival-washington-dc-tells-sponsors
[https://perma.cc/L38T-HYMT].
287. Id.
288. In March 2021, another bill, the Token Taxonomy Act, was introduced into the
House of Representatives. See H.R. 1628, 117th Cong. (2021). Actually, this bill was
already introduced in 2019 but ended up being a dead end. See H.R. 2144, 116th Cong.
(2019). The bill specified that digital tokens, such as those used in virtual currencies,
were not securities for regulatory purposes. Additionally, it provided for the tax treatment
of virtual currencies and excluded from gross income any gains from virtual currency
transactions up to $600. See Securities Clarity Act, H.R. 8378, 116th Cong. §2(b) (2020);
Guseva, supra note 282, at 10 n.50.
289. See H.R. 3684, 117th Cong. (2021). The changes concerning digital assets will
be effective to any information return required to be filed after December 31, 2023. Id.
290. In particular, the new reporting requirements regard (1) cryptocurrency asset
exchanges and custodians (on an IRS Form 1099) and (2) certain persons who accept
large payments in cryptocurrency in such person’s trade or business (on an IRS Form
8300). With respect to the former, the Bill redefined the term “broker” under IRC 6045
to include “any person who (for consideration) is responsible for regularly providing any
service effectuating transfers of digital assets on behalf of another person.” H.R. 3684,
117th Cong. (2021), §6045(c)(3)(D). Consequently, under the new provisions,
cryptocurrency exchanges will be treated like traditional brokerage houses. See id. at
§6045(d). Regarding the latter, the Bill expanded the definition of cash to include
cryptocurrency. Id. at §6045(d)(3). As a result, any person who, in the course of such
person’s trade or business, receives more than $10,000 in value via cryptocurrency (in
one or two or more related transactions) will be required to file an IRS Form 8300
indicating (1) the identifying information of the payer (including such individuals name,
address, occupation, and taxpayer identification number) (2) the identifying information
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Blockchain Association291 expressed some concerns about the newlyintroduced provision; clearly this debate is gaining momentum.292
However, even if there were a federal intervention, Wyoming’s position
might be only partly affected, since its strategy is broader and not limited to
said exemptions for utility tokens. This jurisdiction made the development of
blockchain business a true priority and introduced further exemptions to
banking and financial services regulation in 2019 after rejecting293 the
Uniform Law Commission’s regulatory model for crypto and blockchain
assets.294 For instance, Wyoming’s lawmakers considered that many
blockchain and cryptocurrency innovators are unable to secure reliable
banking services under normal conditions, and this might hamper the
development of these kinds of services and products. Thus, the state
legislature enacted bill that introduced “special purpose depository
institutions” (SPDIs).295 These institutions are allowed to receive deposits
and conduct a range of other traditional banking activities (including
fiduciary asset management, custody, and related activities) without being
required to secure insurance from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).296 As a result, those Wyoming institutions that were
unable to obtain FDIC insurance due to their dealings with
cryptocurrencies can now apply for the SPDI bank charter and offer
banking services.297
of the person on whose behalf the transaction was conducted and (3) a description of the
transaction and method of payment. See Timothy L. Jacobs et al., New Cryptocurrency
Information Reporting Regime Required on Form 1099 and Form 8300, 11 NAT’L L.
REV. (2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-cryptocurrency-informationreporting-regime-required-form-1099-and-form-8300 [https://perma.cc/A8QC-BAJX].
291. The lobby of blockchain and cryptocurrency industry. The association is
“dedicated to improving the public policy environment for crypto networks.” See
BLOCKCHAIN ASS’N, https://theblockchainassociation.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/
3ABB-V6TE] (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
292. See Benjamin Pimentel, ‘Twitter is Our Superpower’: The Crypto Lobby Mounts
a D.C. Offensive, PROTOCOL (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.protocol.com/fintech/ cryptoblockchain-association-lobby [https://perma.cc/UAS9-TGYS].
293. See S. 125, 65th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2019).
294. Both the Uniform Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act (URVCBA)
and Supplemental Act, thereby inducing the Commission to reconsider its approach. See
H. 5847, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2019).
295. H.R. 74, 65th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2019).
296. Id.
297. Unlike traditional banks, SPDIs are prohibited from making loans with customer
deposits, which is the reason why they are not required to obtain FDIC insurance
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Wyoming also enacted a statute which created a financial technology
sandbox for blockchain companies to test or manage innovative financial
products and services in the state.298 Furthermore, this jurisdiction
exempts virtual currencies that are used within the jurisdiction from
money transmitter laws and regulations.299 Regarding tax regimes,
Wyoming exempts these currencies from state property taxes.300
Finally, with respect to corporate law, Wyoming passed legislation
authorizing the maintenance of corporate records in a blockchain.301 More
interestingly, it established a chancery court and gave it jurisdiction over
“disputes involving commercial, business, trust and similar issues”.302
This legislative amendment303 is perhaps the strongest indication that
Wyoming is trying to follow Delaware’s steps towards a leading position
in the corporate charters market. Significantly, the jurisdiction of this
court recalls the one established for the Delaware Chancery Court, which
is an essential part of Delaware’s success—as articulated above. The
development of a body of precedents on corporations, and blockchain
companies in particular, by a specialized court is crucial to achieving a
competitive advantage that other jurisdictions cannot easily replicate.
In addition to the statutes already enacted, Wyoming’s Blockchain
Task Force, a legislature-created committee that has drafted many of the
new laws, appears to have forthcoming an ambitious blockchain
agenda.304
(although they are permitted to do so). Therefore, the SPDI charter is designed for those
financial institutions that focus on digital assets, such as virtual currencies, digital
securities, and utility tokens. Special Purpose Depository Institutions, WYO. BANKING
DIV., https://wyomingbankingdivision.wyo.gov/banks-and-trust-companies/special-pur
pose-depository-institutions [https://perma.cc/98YT-V2V6] (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
298. H.R. 57, 65th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2019) (defining an “innovative” financial
product or service as a product or service that uses “new or emerging technology, or new
uses of existing technology, that provides a product, service, business model, or delivery
mechanism to the public and has no substantially comparable, widely available analogue
in Wyoming, including blockchain technology”). Id. at § 40-28-102 (a)(vi). These
innovative financial products or services can be run in a financial sandbox for two years
and extendable for an additional year.
299. H.R. 19, 64th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2018).
300. S. 111, 64th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2018).
301. H.R. 101, 64th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2018). This law requires that for
electronic keys, network signatures, and digital receipts are used.
302. S. 104, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. Art. 1, §§ 5-13-101, 5-13-115(a) (Wyo. 2019).
303. Id.
304. 2020 Select Committee on Blockchain, Financial Technology and Digital
Innovation Technology, WYO. LEG. (2020), https://www.wyoleg.gov/Committees/
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The most recent development is the enactment of the first law in the
United States on decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs)—
effective from July 1, 2021.305 A DAO is a blockchain-based organization
that is governed by rules embedded into computer programs—an
interconnected system of smart contracts, to be accurate. This entity is
autonomous and decentralized in the sense that said computer programs
are stored and executed automatically on a decentralized network of
participating computers—in other words, a blockchain. This ensures great
efficiency, since the programs are not governed by a single source (person
or computer), and the systems apply and enforce the rules
automatically.306
Wyoming’s legislation now grants DAOs the same rights as a limited
liability company. Actually, pursuant to § 17-31-104(a), a decentralized
autonomous organization is precisely a limited liability company whose
articles of organization contain a statement that the company is a
decentralized autonomous organization.307
Arguably, since DAOs have remarkable growth potential, these
recent provisions indicate additional significant differentiation of
2020/S19 [https://perma.cc/4PD3-XE9T]. In 2021, the House passed a bill (H.R. 43),
which amends the definition of digital asset and the provisions related to the nature of
digital assets under commercial law. It also clarifies provisions on the custody of digital
assets by banks and establishes that certain digital assets provisions are consumer
protection statutes for commercial law purposes. H.R. 43, 66th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo.
2021). Also, the Senate passed a bill (S. 38), which provides for the definition, formation,
and management of decentralised autonomous organizations. This confirms Wyoming’s
attention to technological innovation and its intention to exploit any related business
opportunity. S. 38, 66th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2021).
305. Similarly to 1977, when this state innovated corporate law and became the first
U.S. jurisdiction to introduce the limited liability company form. See supra note 272 and
accompanying text. Wyoming is now the first U.S. state to legally recognize DAOs as
limited liability companies, for that matter. See S. 38, 66th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2021)
(codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-31-101 to 17-31-112 (2021)).
306. “A DAO is a blockchain-based system that enables people to coordinate and
govern themselves mediated by a set of self-executing rules deployed on a public
blockchain, and whose governance is decentralised (i.e., independent from central
control).” Samer Hassan & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Autonomous
Organization, 10 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2021).
307. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-31-104(c) (2021). Interestingly, pursuant to the new
section 17-31-112)), members of a DAO have no right to separately inspect or copy
records of the organization, and the organization has no obligation to furnish any
information concerning its activities “to the extent the information is available on an open
blockchain.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-31-112 (2021).
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Wyoming’s legislation in corporate matters and further incentivize tech
companies to elect this jurisdiction as their home state. Moreover, it is a
legislative innovation that is unlikely to be affected by possible federal
intervention. I predict that, if a federal regulation is introduced in the short
term, it would probably regard digital assets and leave DAOs’ regulation
untouched. Therefore, with its enabling regulation on DAOs, Wyoming
has secured another area that will remain attractive for tech incorporation
even in the event of federal intervention on cryptocurrencies and tokens.
In this respect, the new provisions on DAOs confirm both
Wyoming’s ability to adopt strategic moves to captivate blockchain
companies, as well as its determination to lead the tech challenge to
Delaware’s dominance.308
2. Other Jurisdictions on the Same Path
Certainly, other jurisdictions are attempting to exploit the
opportunity provided by blockchain and attract the companies operating
in this sector. For instance, in March 2019, the state of Colorado passed
the noteworthy Colorado Digital Token Act309. This statute addressed
digital tokens and facilitated the sale and transfer of these tokens within
its territory—something that most states have not focused on.310
Specifically, this act exempts the offer or sale of digital tokens that
primarily have a “consumptive purpose” from state securities registration
as long as certain transactional conditions are met.311 It also exempts the
digital token issuer—and those persons acting on its behalf—from the
broker-dealer and salesperson licensing requirements of the Colorado
Securities Act.312 Yet, this jurisdiction has pursued no meaningful
legislative innovation on blockchain and digital assets since then.
308. See S. 38, 66th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2021) (codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§
17-31-101 to 17-31-112 (2021). Interestingly, pursuant to the new section 17-31-112,
members of a DAO have no right to separately inspect or copy records of the
organization, and the organization has no obligation to furnish any information
concerning its activities “to the extent the information is available on an open
blockchain.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-31-112.
309. S. 19-023, 72nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019) (codified at C OLO. REV.
STAT. § 11-51-308.7 (2019)).
310. Michele A. Kulerman and Jason K. Zachary, Colorado Digital Token Act
Exempts Certain Cryptocurrency Transactions from Colorado Securities Laws, DENV.
BUS. J. (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2019/10/01/coloradodigital-token-act-exempts-certain.html [https://perma.cc/JM6G-595A].
311. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-308.7(3)(a) (2019).
312. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-308.7(3)(b) (2019).
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Kentucky has recently introduced tax exemptions for commercial
cryptocurrency miners on tangible property and electricity used for the
mining activity.313 In Montana no license is required to operate in the
digital asset business.314 Texas has given state-chartered banks the
authority to provide services such as custody or safekeeping services for
virtual currencies.315 Further, like in Wyoming, the state legislature
amended the Uniform Commercial Code and included virtual
currencies.316
Most recently, at end of May 2021, Nebraska enacted the Financial
Innovation Act,317 which enables digital asset depository institutions.
Consequently, in this jurisdiction, existing banks may create dedicated
divisions for digital assets, and new institutions may easily be established
by obtaining a specific digital asset depository charter.318
Nevertheless, most of these efforts to attract tech incorporators are
too recent to exhibit any meaningful results and, certainly, one-off
provisions cannot be decisive on whether a state will continue to pursue
this sort of legislation. Wyoming’s legal framework for digital assets
consists of a coordinated series of laws which, as a whole, has no equal.
This jurisdiction has been persistent in its strategy, and its competitive
advantage is currently significant.
313. H.R. 230, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021). Most likely, the purpose
of these exemptions was to catch the windfall of Chinese crackdown. See Cheyenne
Ligon, Blockware Raises $25M to Expand Bitcoin Mining Operations in Kentucky,
COINDESK (June 30, 2021, 8:22 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/blockware-raises25m-to-expand-bitcoin-mining-operations-in-kentucky
[https://perma.cc/5NNY-NR
BG]. Nevertheless, given the low cost of electricity, many blockchain businesses
relocated in Kazakhstan (Note for editor: none of the materials here mention Kazakhstan,
only Texas and Tennessee) or Texas or Tennessee, after leaving China. See, e.g., Dalvin
Brown, Bitcoin Miners Break New Ground in Texas, a State Hailed as the New
Cryptocurrency
Capital,
WASH. POST (July
8,
2021,
4:12
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2021/07/08/bitcoin-mining-texaselectricity/ [https://perma.cc/B3EF-VW UX].
314. Actually, there is no legislation at all from the Montana Division of Banking
regulating money transmitters. This means that in Montana money transmitters do not
have to be licensed with the Division. However, they do need to be registered as a
business with the Montana Secretary of State. Money Service Businesses, MONTANA.GOV,
https://banking.mt.gov/moneytransmitters [https://perma.cc/K94M-JBRN] (last visited
Jan. 24, 2022).
315. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 32.001 (West year).
316. H.R. 4474, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021).
317. Leg. 649, 107th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2021).
318. Id.
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3. The Segmentation of the Corporate Charters Market
Blockchain offers clear promise and potential both to business and
corporate life. Some argue that blockchain technology will continue to
develop quickly, as will its use in business and corporate life, regardless
of how legislatures frame regulation.319 Therefore, “everyone—including
industry players, members of the public, and governments themselves—
will gain if lawmakers can strike the right balance between innovation
and public protection.”320
What Wyoming is attempting to achieve is clearly something
different and is going mostly unnoticed in terms of competition for the
corporate charters market. As I have argued above, this jurisdiction is
targeting a specific segment of this market: the incorporations of digital
asset businesses. Other jurisdictions, such as Vermont, although not
disinterested in cryptocurrencies and tokens, are more inclined to attract
corporations that aim to explore what blockchain can do to simplify
corporate life and make it more efficient.321 Delaware is being prudent yet
not undaring: its amendments to the DGCL are focused on how this
technological innovation can provide a better governance and reduce
intermediation costs.322 By contrast, Wyoming is exploiting blockchain to
get ahead on this new segment of the corporate charters market and take
it away from Delaware.
In this respect, Wyoming is replicating the market segmentation
strategy already conceived and put in place by Nevada for small firms.
There are some similarities. As in Nevada’s case, Delaware is unlikely to
follow Wyoming in adopting such liberal laws for digital asset businesses
for a simple reason: should Delaware introduce laws that are too lax, the
federal legislature might intervene.
However, unlike Nevada, Wyoming is creating a safe harbor by
introducing exemptions or custom-made provisions in multiple fields of
regulation, including state securities regulation.323 This is consistent with
the aims of the blockchain industry.
Finally, Wyoming’s strategic choice of targeting a market segment
that might have real growth potential marks an important difference from
319. Michele Benedetto Neitz, How to Regulate Blockchain’s Real-Life Applications:
Lessons from the California Blockchain Working Group, 61 JURIMETRICS J. 185, 185
(2021).
320. Id.
321. See Caytas, supra note 256.
322. See id. See also supra Section II.B.3.
323. See Neitz, supra note 245, at 214-15.
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Nevada’s approach: the market segment of small firms (looking for a
liability-free jurisdiction) is not comparable in terms of size and return on
investment (ROI) with the blockchain market.324 This consideration might
have two implications. On the one hand, if the blockchain market
continues to grow steadily and Wyoming’s strategy eventually succeeds,
Wyoming might earn the “tech dominance” label for which it is aiming.
On the other hand, if this market segment grows significantly and
Wyoming succeeds in attracting cryptocurrency businesses, the federal
legislature is likely to intervene and regulate the sector.
C. CALCULATED RISK OR UNREASONABLE HAZARD?
Speculators contend that Wyoming’s lawmakers are writing these
provisions “under dictation” of cryptocurrency wealth holders and
without a full understanding of the matter—which is undoubtedly
technical.325 However, it is also true that the novel nature of this young
industry and a lack of model legislation calls for a close coordination with
the businesses involved.
Regardless of whether this particular criticism is justified, Wyoming
seems to be succeeding in attracting some tech-incorporators so far. 326
Yet, it is taking a risky gamble.
324. A survey released in October 2020 revealed that more than half of U.S. investors
(55 percent) would be interested in investing in virtual currencies. This marks a
substantial increase in interest from 2019, when 36 percent of investors said they would
consider a Bitcoin investment. See Grayscale Investments Study Shows More than Half
of U.S. Investor Survey Respondents Would Consider Investing in Bitcoin and 23%
Already Have, GLOBE NEWSWIRE (Oct. 27, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.globenews
wire.com/news-release/2020/10/27/2115198/0/en/Grayscale-Investments-Study-ShowsMore-than-Half-of-U-S-Investor-Survey-Respondents-Would-Consider-Investing-inBitcoin-and-23-Already-Have.html [https://perma.cc/3GSH-HKGL]. Nevertheless,
there may be a significant number of investors interested in investing in blockchain
technologies or simply in trading using a blockchain. Similarly, there may be a large
number of corporations interested in experimenting with blockchain innovation. The
question is how much the number of corporations mining cryptocurrencies or offering
the related services might grow.
325. See Andrew Graham, Links Drive Allegation of Insiders Writing Crypto Bills,
WYOFILE (Nov. 26, 2019), https://wyofile.com/links-drive-allegation-of-insiderswriting-crypto-bills/ [https://perma.cc/Z3TY-9A8W].
326. Data are uncertain because Wyoming laws do not require an entity to provide the
Secretary of State’s Office with a purpose or the type of business. In a search for certain
keywords like “blockchain” or “crypto,” only the entities having those keywords in their
names will come up. An indication of the success in attracting tech-incorporators can be
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Certainly, New Jersey’s and Nevada’s experiences generate insights
as to whether Wyoming is likely to succeed or not. The theories and
arguments that I set forth above may be applied to assess Wyoming’s
strategy.327 For example, the application of the credible commitment
theory and of the network theory to this case suggests that Wyoming’s
challenge requires an unlikely, albeit not impossible, combination of
circumstances to succeed.328
The reason can be easily explained by considering the dynamics of
these theories as I articulated above. In particular, Wyoming is emerging
as a jurisdiction committed to providing the blockchain community with
a favorable legal framework and it is trying to capitalize on this
reputation.329 This strategy is consistent with both the credible
commitment and network theories. Nevertheless, setting up a securities
framework that features little to no control can be a short-sighted strategy,
if not a hazard. This approach might succeed in enticing blockchain
corporations on one hand but, on the other, might be detrimental for
clients, users, and even investors to a certain extent. Such a permissive
line of legislation might endanger the public and be at risk for
exploitation. In this case, the repercussions might end up damaging
Wyoming’s reputation and ambitions.
Moreover, building popularity either to generate the credible
commitment effect or the network effect needs time.330 As I explained,
should the federal legislature intervene, the room for Wyoming to
differentiate its legislation from that of other states would shrink. Since
Wyoming is using this differentiation to attract cryptocurrency
incorporators, the result of such federal action would be a dramatic
decrease of its competitiveness.
On a different note, the application of the Delaware trap argument331
to Wyoming’s strategy enables some favorable conclusions. The plan of
focusing on blockchain companies by crafting innovative, specialized
legislation might earn this jurisdiction some advantage in terms of the
that, after the first wave of laws in favor of these businesses in 2018, more than 200
corporations with names relating to blockchain technologies or cryptocurrencies
registered in Wyoming. See Ben McLannahan, Wyoming’s Pioneering Crypto Cowboys
Beef Up the Supply Chain, FIN. TIMES (July 1, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/
da69a410-6972-11e8-b6eb-4acfcfb08c11 [https://perma.cc/B2NL-9BJ7].
327. See Caytas, supra note 256, at 9.
328. See Molk supra note 58, at 1170.
329. See Neitz, supra note 245, at 214-15.
330. See Molk, supra note 58, at 1173-74.
331. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
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charters market. This might also induce law schools to teach Wyoming’s
blockchain law. Additionally, if Wyoming mirrors Delaware corporate
law in the other areas, it might benefit from the educational cycle
illustrated above.332 In other words, if legal counsels become familiar with
Wyoming’s law on blockchain, they could minimize learning costs by
recommending tech-incorporators to incorporate in Wyoming. Thus, this
jurisdiction might even prevail over the trap in which corporations fall
and which reinforce Delaware’s leading position.
However, under another line of argument, Wyoming—like any other
jurisdiction—is unlikely to gain and retain an advantage in the market for
corporate charter only because of favorable blockchain legislation. As I
have reported, some hold that New Jersey did not lose its leading position
because of the Seven Sisters package of laws, but rather because of
competition from other jurisdictions.333 Viewed in this way, a competitive
advantage merely based on legislation is transient. The lesson to draw
from New Jersey’s experience is that other state legislatures could
replicate the most favorable provisions of a successful jurisdiction or even
the whole legislation, thereby neutralizing the competitive advantage.
While free-ride legal innovations are easy to copy and likely to lead
merely to short-term gains in the market for corporate charters,
innovations that are costly to copy can secure more enduring gains.334 As
I argued above, except Delaware, other jurisdictions could mirror—and
in some cases are already mirroring—Wyoming’s laws on digital assets
and frustrate its efforts.335 Therefore, Wyoming should aim to develop an
expertise that other jurisdictions could not quickly replicate, such as a
body of case law about this matter. The establishment of a chancery court
is, in light of this, an astute initiative. However, this plan needs time and
commitment; it also requires that other jurisdictions do not immediately
follow the same path—at least not with Wyoming’s persistence and
coordination.

332.
333.
334.

Id.
See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
See SANGA, supra note 25, at 5 (discussing New Jersey’s historical lesson and
maintaining that “a free-rideable innovation such as New Jersey’s liberalizing experiment
can only lead to short-term gains in the charters market. Only innovations that are costly
to copy are capable of yielding lasting gains”). In applying this line of reasoning to
Wyoming’s strategy, the obvious conclusion is that this jurisdiction is unlikely to achieve
a valuable result.
335. See supra Section II.B.2.
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To sum up, Wyoming’s challenge to Delaware’s dominance is surely
ambitious, and its success is conditioned upon the alignment of several
factors. Speculating on the outcome of this strategy is not easy. In an
innovative market like blockchain there are several variables, and
accommodations in the new legislation are probable. Accurate data on
blockchain companies’ incorporations in Wyoming are missing,336 and
the track record stacks the deck against challengers.
Wyoming is following the market segmentation strategy adopted by
the only relatively successful Delaware contender—Nevada—and is
pushing it further. Nevertheless, to the extent that Wyoming’s strategy
pays off, it will secure a leading position only in that niche segment of the
corporate charters market, while Delaware will continue to dominate the
vast majority.
That said, it is currently uncertain whether Wyoming’s policy is a
calculated risk or an unreasonable hazard. Since Delaware is not easy to
dethrone and market segmentation appears to be the only way to capture
a fragment of the charters market, Wyoming’s current approach is the
most realistic, promising, and maybe the only possible strategy.
Therefore, the question is whether Wyoming can achieve a leading
position in this segment before a federal legislation regulates the matter
or displaces Wyoming state laws on blockchain. Should Wyoming gain
the lead before federal intervention, it might retain an advantage even
after it.
V. CONCLUSION
After more than a century, Delaware is still dominating the market
for corporate charters. Other jurisdictions are becoming more important,
but there is no end in sight to Delaware’s dominance in this area.
Some contend that Delaware’s response to overlitigation in the
M&A field might trigger a migration to other jurisdictions that are less
restrictive for shareholder lawsuits—and this might question Delaware’s
leading position. I argue that these lawsuits are mostly frivolous and other
states would have no incentive to attract them, since such cases entail no
significant judicial opinion. Legitimate cases would stay in Delaware,
where attorneys’ fees are traditionally higher. Besides, the new standard
Delaware adopted in Trulia was already followed by federal courts in
Walgreen and extended to mootness fees cases in Akorn. I contend that
Delaware will perfect the Trulia standard and adjust its case law; soon
336.

See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
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enough, even the more reluctant jurisdictions will follow. Therefore, the
impact of this line of cases on Delaware’s dominance is unlikely to be
remarkable.
I also contend that the federal legislature does not constitute an
imminent threat to this dominance. I submit that a federal incorporation
is only a remote possibility. Congress has never succeeded to enact a
federal incorporation law and, even if there was a federal charter, it would
not replace state incorporation. A federal intervention, possibly provoked
by the permissive corporate laws of offshore jurisdictions, need not affect
state-to-state competition and, consequently, Delaware’s position.
More generally, with respect to the gradual erosion of state corporate
law by federal legislation, the process has endured for almost a century.
Although the federal legislature is increasingly important for business
regulation, it will not end Delaware’s dominance in the short-term.
Furthermore, Delaware is aware that the federal legislature could
intervene if Delaware lawmakers fail to address corporate law issues that
generate public anxiety or media attention. Yet, Delaware has a strong
incentive to keep this dynamic under control and, so far, has succeeded in
doing so.
As I illustrated, Nevada is the only challenger of Delaware that has
achieved success, albeit limited. Its market segmentation strategy proved
to be effective to some extent and made this jurisdiction a desirable place
of incorporation for small firms.
More interestingly, Nevada’s experience offers some insight for the
new challenge to Delaware’s dominance posed by Wyoming through
blockchain technology.
Wyoming is attempting to exploit the opportunities provided by
blockchain to attract incorporators. In particular, this jurisdiction is
creating a safe harbor for a specific segment of the market that involves
the incorporations of digital asset businesses and is introducing custommade provisions or exemptions in multiple fields of regulation—
including state securities laws. Although Wyoming is targeting a different
sector and displaying a greater commitment, it is essentially replicating
the market segmentation strategy that Nevada adopted years ago to attract
small firms. Yet, unlike Nevada, Wyoming is targeting a market segment
that might have real growth potential. This might make Wyoming the
leader of a significant market segment, but it could also induce the federal
legislature to intervene and regulate the sector.
Wyoming’s challenge is mounting, but time is the key factor. The
application of the credible commitment theory and the network theory to
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Wyoming’s approach suggests that the strategy of building a reputation
and proving a commitment to tech-incorporators is correct but is also
conditioned upon a confluence of events which needs time. I argue that
Wyoming setting up a chancery court dedicated to business and corporate
matters was the right move. The state should develop an expertise that is
too costly to be easily replicated by other jurisdictions and earn a share of
the charters market before federal legislature and regulatory bodies preempt Wyoming’s laws for tokens and cryptocurrencies.
However, to the extent that Wyoming’s tactic proves to be effective,
it will earn this jurisdiction a leading position only in a segment of the
corporate charters market, while Delaware will continue to dominate the
rest of it. Clearly, the significance of this segment will depend upon the
growth of cryptocurrencies.
In light of all this, Wyoming’s approach might look like a dare. In
fact, this new challenge is likely to end up with the same result:
Delaware’s dominance. Yet, it is currently the most promising strategy, if
not to dethrone Delaware, to at least to dent its enduring hegemony.

